University of Massachusetts Boston

ScholarWorks at UMass Boston
William Monroe Trotter Institute Publications

William Monroe Trotter Institute

6-1-1985

Community-Based Housing: Potential for a New
Strategy
Rachel G. Bratt
Tufts University

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.umb.edu/trotter_pubs
Part of the Housing Law Commons, Public Policy Commons, Race and Ethnicity Commons,
Social Policy Commons, and the Urban Studies Commons
Recommended Citation
Bratt, Rachel G., "Community-Based Housing: Potential for a New Strategy" (1985). William Monroe Trotter Institute Publications.
Paper 21.
http://scholarworks.umb.edu/trotter_pubs/21

This Research Report is brought to you for free and open access by the William Monroe Trotter Institute at ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. It has been
accepted for inclusion in William Monroe Trotter Institute Publications by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at UMass Boston. For more
information, please contact library.uasc@umb.edu.

TROTTER INSTITUTE
Community-Based Housing:
Potential for a

New Strategy

by
Rachel G. Bratt

RESEARCH REPORT

WILLIAM

MONROE TROTTER

INSTITUTE

UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AT BOSTON

BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS 02125-3393

Archives
HD

03

Ift
B7
1985

Research Report No. 2

Community-Based Housing:
Potential for a

New Strategy

by
Rachel G. Bratt

June, 1985

ENSEPETITPLACIDAMSUB

LIBER

H
>
Joseph T. Healey Library
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

BOSTON

^MASSACHUSETTS BOSTO NgJ
Rachel Bratt is assistant professor of Urban and Environmental Policy at Tufts
University, Medford, Massachusetts.

A
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction

3

Overview of Community-Based Housing Initiatives

10

Roots of Community-Based Housing Development

23

Assessment of Community-Based Housing Strategy

32

Building a Model Support System for Community-Based Housing

40

Evolution of the Massachusetts Support System for

Community-Based Housing

44

The Emergence of the Massachusetts System of Support
for

Community-Based Housing

54

Observations from the Massachusetts Experience

60

Final Thoughts

69

Notes

71

References

74

Individuals Consulted

80

INTRODUCTION
While the housing problem in the United States has changed since Franklin
Delano Roosevelt proclaimed that "one- third of the nation is ill-housed," it has by no

means disappeared. 1 For most low-income people, and to a lesser extent for moderate
income people, housing still presents formidable problems.

A sampling of newspaper

headlines from the past few years highlights the types of housing issues facing
millions of Americans:

"Elderly Couple Forced to

Move as Building Goes Condo"

"Interest Rates Soar"

'The Search

for

Rental Housing"

"Fear of Displacement Widespread in South End"

"Rent Control

is

Hotly Debated in City Council"

"Defaults in Subsidized Housing Prompt

HUD to Question Next Move"

"Drop in Housing Starts Concerns Building Industry"

"Family of Six Lives in Bus in Junkyard"

"Reagan Outs Assisted Housing"
Academics and housing analysts recognize four major aspects of the housing
problem: affordability (ratio of housing costs to income), adequacy (including quality

and overcrowding), neighborhood conditions, and availability. Over the past decade,
the nature of the country's housing problem has undergone some important
transformations.

Until ten years ago the phrase "housing problem" conjured up images of low
quality housing and overcrowded conditions that were principally the concern of low-

income and minority people. By the

late 1970s,

however, a new aspect of the housing

problem-affordability-had become fixed in the American consciousness. Since that

time there has been general agreement among housing analysts that the burden of

housing costs relative

to

income has gotten worse, while overall quality has

improved. Although blacks and other minorities have benefited from these

improvements, their housing situations remain considerably worse than those of the
general population. For example, black households have:

•

Higher shelter-to-income ratios;

•

Lower rates of home ownership;

•

Higher incidence of occupancy in physically inadequate housing;

•

Higher risks of being displaced from their homes due to various public
(highways and urban redevelopment) as well as private (condo conversions)
actions;

•

and

Reduced access to available units due to discrimination.

In recent years there has been considerable debate on one key aspect of the

housing problem: the adequacy of the supply of low-cost housing.

On one hand, a

HUD report asserted that "[tjhere is no current nationwide shortage in the rental
housing market" (1981,

p. ii).

,

While admitting that "there are adverse conditions for

rental housing existing in some local areas," the report concluded that "the rental

housing market is not currently in a

crisis state

on a national level" (1981,

p. 3).

Several noted housing economists have come to similar conclusions. For example, Ira

Lowry claimed that he was "unable to find persuasive evidence of a general shortage
of rental housing

" (1981, p. 35).

On the other hand, some housing analysts (Sternlieb and Hughes,

1981; Goetze,

1983) and even government agencies (GAO, 1979) have argued that there
affordable rental units, particularly for lower income and large families.

is

a lack of

The debate

has become so confusing that a 1983 report by the Brookings Institution, seemingly
all at

the same time, predicted a shortfall of rental units, denied that the shortfall can

actually persist, and admitted that it could take the market some time "before

adjustments can take place" (Downs, 1983,

p. 127).

Rhetoric aside, data generated in

many locales-in addition to the observations

and experiences of most renters-point in the direction of rental housing shortages. In
Boston,

New York, San Francisco, and many other large cities, the rental vacancy

rate, particularly for

low and moderately priced units,

is

well below 5%, the generally

accepted minimum that is needed to support household mobility (Achtenberg, 1982;

Hartman, 1983; Liebert,1983). Although alarming, vacancy rate data do not tell the
whole

story. Available units that are the right size

places and must be affordable to those

must be located in the right

who need shelter. (Hartman,

1983). Further,

even when vacant units and needy households are matched, the possibility that
discrimination will limit access

still

poses very real problems (Feins and Bratt, 1983).

The issue of homelessness, which has attracted considerable media attention in
recent years, puts the controversy around whether or not there are shortages of

housing in human terms.

What, if anything, should be done? Increasingly, the answer being given

is

"not

much." Citing a "lack of evidence of housing market failure," Frank de Leeuw, chief
statistician of the U.S.

as

it is,

Department of Commerce, has stated: "the rental

crisis,

does not warrant any special rental housing market remedies" (1981,

The President's Commission on Housing neatly summed up the conservative
on the

role of government in the housing

such

p. 64).

position

market in the following manner: "[T]he

genius of the market economy, freed of the distortions forced by government housing
policies,

.

.

.

can provide

for

According to this position,

housing far better than Federal programs" (1982,

all

p. xvii).

that is called for in terms of government intervention

is

a program that will increase effective demand. (Proponents of this position often arm

themselves with criticisms of the long-standing subsidized production programs. 2 )
Direct cash vouchers or housing allowances that enable lower income

households

to rent units

on the private market have also been proposed and

supported by many academics and policymakers as a solution

to the

housing shortage

problem (Aaron,1972; Solomon, 1974; President's Commission on Housing, 1982;

Downs, 1983). In recent years,

this idea

has been translated into public policy. 3

However, even the most ardent proponents of this approach admit that it would
neither substantially improve the quality of the existing stock, nor stimulate the
construction of much low-income housing

(HUD, 1980a; President's Commission on

Housing, 1982).
This paper takes the view that there have been no serious restrictions imposed

on the private market that have thwarted its ability to provide housing for low-

income people, 4 and that the unassisted private housing market is simply not the
answer. Even the President's Commission on Housing bluntly stated that "the
private

market has been unwilling or unable to house many of these [low-income,

single-parent, minority

Since

and large] families

."
.

.

(1982, p. 31).

we cannot rely on the private market to respond to the housing needs of

low-income people without public incentives, there
to

is

a clear need for the public sector

play a major role. What, then, are the options for increasing the supply (either

through new construction or substantial rehabilitation) of low- rent housing? Thus
far,

two broad public policies have been pursued in this country: private housing

production with public incentives and direct production ownership of housing by the
public sector.

Private Housing Production with Public Incentives
Starting in 1959 the

first in

a series of programs that provided financial

incentives to private builders of multifamily housing

was enacted. Section 202

provided direct government loans at below-market interest rates to nonprofit
builders of elderly housing. Section 221(d)(3), enacted in 1961, authorized the federal

government, through the Federal National Mortgage Association,

to

purchase

mortgages at a 3% interest rate. For-profit or nonprofit developers were

eligible to

receive these low-interest loans. Section 236, enacted in 1968, also authorized
interest rate subsidies. Instead of the public financing

arrangement of the Section

221(d)(3) program, the Section 236 subsidy lowered the interest rate on mortgages,

which were provided by private financial institutions,

to as

low as 1%. The Section 8

New Construction Program, enacted in 1974, replaced the Section 236 program.
Under Section 8, developers constructed new or substantially rehabilitated rental
units for lower-income people. Tenants paid 25-30% 5 of their income for rent with the
difference between this

amount and HUD-established "fair market rents" supplied as

a subsidy by the government. The Housing and Urban-Rural Recovery Act of 1983
included no

new authorizations for this program. (Another component of the Section

8 program provided a similar subsidy for households renting existing units on the
private market-the Section 8 Existing Housing Program. This program
operational. Also see note
projects

3).

By late

is still

1978, over 6,700 federally subsidized housing

had been built through the Section 221(d)(3)and 236 programs, representing

over 600,000 units of housing (HUD, 1980b). The Section 202 and Section 8

New

Construction Program have contributed over 100,000 and over 700,000 units,
respectively

(HUD, 1978a; Maffin,

1983).

Direct Production and Ownership of Housing by the Public Sector

There has been only one major housing program in the United States that has
involved direct production and ownership by the public sector. The Public Housing

Program, created by the United States Housing Act of 1937, authorized
authorities to construct and

local

housing

manage low-cost housing. Capital was raised by floating

tax-exempt bonds, which were purchased by private investors. The federal

government contracted to pay the principal and interest on these notes over a 40-year
period. Thus, the federal

government covered the long-term debt financing while

ownership and management were vested in

local public agencies. In 1969,

Congress

enacted the

first in

a series of operating subsidies that protected tenants from rising

maintenance and energy costs.

Launched as a post-depression recovery measure

to

stimulate the construction

industry and to reduce unemployment, public housing has always had a host of
vociferous opponents.

From the outset, conservative critics labeled it a "socialist

program" and denounced the reliance on the public sector for providing a good that
could be produced by the private market (Friedman, 1968). Others have pointed to
the poor design of public housing buildings and high operating costs as justifications
for

abandoning the program. Although there has been relatively little construction

of public housing over the past 15 years, since the program's inception, over 1.2

million units have been built.

Program Observations

What have been the experiences of the subsidized multifamily production
programs? Very briefly, based on previous review and comparative studies by this
author (Bratt, 1985; Bratt, forthcoming), the following are some of the most relevant
observations.

•

Subsidized multifamily housing can be good housing, and there are
generally high levels of satisfaction

among tenants in subsidized

developments.

•

A comparison of the two main types of subsidized housing-privately owne,d
housing produced with public incentives and public housing-reveals that
the latter has proved more successful because of its ability to provide
generally decent quality, financially viable housing with a historically
clear public purpose. In addition, public housing is more available to

minorities and families with very low incomes than are other subsidy

programs.
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•

Both types of subsidized housing programs

also

have some serious

problems. The Public Housing Program has been criticized because of poor

design and management, a high incidence of racial segregation, and

inadequate funding to meet operating and modernization

•

In the privately

costs.

owned subsidized developments, problems also have

,

resulted from poor construction and management and inadequate operating
reserves. In addition, this approach has

some serious built-in drawbacks.

For instance, because length of use restrictions (the time during which the

housing must be used exclusively by low-income tenants) are limited in
such developments, privately owned subsidized housing can eventually be
sold off and used for non-low-income use. In addition,

foreclosures in the publicly subsidized, privately

Sections 221 (d)(3) and 236) have forced

numerous

owned developments (i.e.,

HUD to assume ownership and

dispose of many buildings. Unfortunately,

purpose goals and allowed scores of projects

HUD has sacrificed public
to

be bought by for-profit

developers for market rate use.

The Role of Community-Based Groups
Although nonprofit and community-based groups have sponsored some housing
under the Section

221(d)(3), 236,

and 8 programs, these

efforts

were relatively minor

compared to the strategies of production already discussed. As a
for

result, the potential

a community-based housing strategy has not been fully explored. The main focus

of this paper

is

on community-based initiatives that have rehabilitated and produced

subsidized housing. However, in order to gain a fuller appreciation for the overall

approach the

first section

provides an overview of three additional types of

community-based housing initiatives: management and conversion of subsidized
housing; rehabilitation and conversion of private rental housing; and

home

ownership and home ownership support programs. The second section of the paper
presents an in-depth view of the historical and contemporary role of nonprofits and

community-based groups in rehabilitating and producing subsidized housing. In the
third section,

I

present a brief assessment of the overall community-based housing

strategy, using the following criteria:

•

Ability to provide direct housing assistance;

•

Potential for producing social and

•

Potential for producing benefits to individuals;

•

Ease of implementation;

•

Likelihood of producing benefits that outweigh costs;

•

Potential for replication; and

•

Ability to affect the root causes of the problem being addressed.

community benefits;

The fourth section of this paper outlines a model support system for communitybased housing initiatives. The

fifth

and sixth sections trace the growth of a set of

state agencies in Massachusetts that
for
it

have evolved into an impressive support system

community-based housing. The Massachusetts experience

is

instructive because

serves as an example of how the public sector can provide "top-down" supports to

"bottom-up" community-based housing activities. Seventh, and finally,
series of observations,

I offer

a

drawn from the Massachusetts experience, about the potential

for creating additional public support

systems for community-based housing.

OVERVIEW OF COMMUNITY-BASED HOUSING INITIATIVES
By

1978,

it

appeared that the federal government was ready to embrace

help and local initiative as a

self-

new ingredient in its housing and community

development programs. While

citizen participation

had been a mandated component

of federal programs for decades, President Carter's urban policy

and the subsequent

enactment of the Neighborhood Self-Help Development Act (NSHD) and the
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Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation Act, both in 1978, seemed to guarantee a
role for grassroots,

community-based efforts. 6

In announcing the

Geno C. Baroni,

first

round of funding under NSHD in the spring of 1980,

assistant secretary of HUD's Office of Neighborhoods, Voluntary

Associations and

Consumer Protection (now disbanded), emphasized the rationale for

supporting locally-based initiatives:

We know these projects will have a major impact on their communities because
they were conceived and initiated by the people in the neighborhoods they will
serve. These groups are deeply rooted in their neighborhoods and they are
uniquely capable of developing projects to meet the needs of their own areas.

(HUD,

1980c)

Despite the appeal of Baroni's argument and the subsequent success of NSHD

(Mayer, 1984), President Reagan removed this program from the federal agenda
early in his first term. Furthermore, with the phase-out of the Section 8

New

Construction and Substantial Rehabilitation programs in the early 1980s

community-based housing efforts face an uncertain future. Nevertheless, these
initiatives have, over the past 20 years, produced

programs that are instructive

an array of diverse housing

for several reasons: they offer provocative solutions to

complex housing problems; they provide further evidence of the desperate need for
decent, affordable housing; and they underscore the potential of a wider scale

community-based housing strategy.

Community-based housing programs can be defined as efforts in which

members of a community group or tenants join together to produce, rehabilitate,
and/or manage housing. The central feature of such programs
often ownership of the housing

is

in the

housing or the community. These

community action that have

is

that control and

hands of the individuals who

efforts

live in the

can be distinguished from other forms of

resulted in legislative or regulatory initiatives

Community Reinvestment Act, 7 local

rent control, and

11

(e.g.,

condominium conversion

ordinances). Community-based housing programs directly provide housing, or
services or resources that are needed for housing; legislative initiatives depend on

other actors to change their mode of operation to make housing more available or
affordable.

Community-based housing programs usually rely on considerable funding and
technical assistance from outside sources. In this sense, they are not strictly selfhelp. Self-help efforts that are dependent on individuals helping themselves or each

other in an informal context-such as through

home repairs or renovations-will not be

considered here. Instead, only those activities that are carried out through a formal
or semi-formal arrangement or organizational framework will be examined.

Management and Conversion of Subsidized Housing
Frustrations with public housing and other publicly subsidized housing

programs have stimulated community groups to undertake management of
developments. Perhaps the most well-known example of tenant-managed public

housing developments is in

St. Louis.

In that city, tenant management corporations

(TMCs) oversee the operation of more than 3,000 apartments in five family
developments. Robert Kolodny has written the following about St. Louis' TMCs:

An independent evaluation of the mature program has not been made, but there
seems little question that the TMCs have mastered traditional real estate
management
projects,

They [the TMCs] have overseen substantial upgrading of the
which they inherited in an advanced state of under-occupancy and

physical deterioration. (1981a, p. 137)

Based on the experiences in
other cities,

St. Louis, as

well as TMC programs in at least five

HUD launched a three-year demonstration of tenant management in

1976 (Struyk, 1980). The results of the national program appear to parallel those
reported in St. Louis:

The National Tenant Management demonstration has shown that management
by tenants is a feasible alternative to conventional public housing management
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under certain conditions. In the majority of the demonstration sites, the tenant
participants-all long-time residents of low-income public housing, most
unemployed, and the majority black and female family heads-mastered in three
years the skills necessary to assume management responsibility for the housing
The evaluation of tenant management on
developments in which they lived
a series of measured standard performance indicators such as rent collection
and the quality and timeliness of maintenance, shows that the residents were
able to manage their developments as well as prior management had and, in so
doing, to provide employment for some tenants and increase the overall
satisfaction of the general resident population. (Manpower Demonstration
Research Corporation, 1981, p. 239)
Despite the positive results, the report also indicated that the additional costs of

tenant management were not justified. Yet, for most of the localities involved, tenant

management was continued even after HUD's supplemental funds were exhausted,
operations have continued to improve, and, over the past few years, additional

TMCs

have been formed (Kolodny, 1985). Kolodny has concluded that:

Tenant management is not an unalloyed success, but in surviving and to some
extent prospering at most of the sites where it has been introduced, it shows
If the
more potential and usefulness than it is generally given credit for
expanded
include local empowerment,
objectives
of low rent housing
employment opportunities for residents, leadership development, and some
.

.

.

.

.

.

progress toward the revitalization of severely depressed residential districts,
then tenant management would seem to have substantial if not fully realized
possibilities. (1983, p. 68)

Another community-based housing program involving subsidized multifamily
housing is the conversion of developments to tenant or community ownership.

Although

it is

noteworthy that the Boston area

is rich

with examples of such

conversion projects, innovation has been born from necessity. Out of a total of 14,000

multifamily subsidized housing units that have been built or rehabilitated in Boston
over the past two decades, about half are currently confronting serious financial
difficulties,

with tenants facing substantial rent increases or displacement (Citizens

Housing and Planning Association,
Gardens,

1980). In one such development,

Warren

HUD became the owner following foreclosure and the tenants assumed

control as a cooperative.

The process was facilitated by the Citizens Housing and

13

Planning Association, a local nonprofit housing advocacy group, and was made
possible

by the availability of Section 8 rental assistance.

The way in which a tenant cooperative is structured has important
implications. If it is a limited-equity cooperative,

members are guaranteed security

and all other rights of home ownership; shares, however, are prevented from
inflating along with the general market. In this way, the housing units are

maintained as a permanent resource

for

low-income households. Without this

safeguard, subsidized housing could be lost for future generations of low-income

households.

There are also some examples of HUD transferring the

titles of foreclosed

multifamily developments to community, as opposed to tenant, groups. Urban Edge,
a community-based housing organization located in the Jamaica Plain section of
Boston, has acquired several HUD-foreclosed buildings and currently operates them
as rental housing.

Rehabilitation and Conversion of Private Rental Housing
In recent years, the threat of displacement due to gentrification and conversion
of rental housing to high cost

condominiums has stimulated tenant and community

activism. For example, Jubilee Housing, a

community group operating in a

gentrifying neighborhood in Washington, D.C., has purchased and rehabilitated

multifamily buildings without using federal subsidies. Depending primarily on

donated time and money from private individuals and foundations, Jubilee owns and
operates six buildings with a total of 213 units. In Boston, tenants of a 12-unit

building formed a limited equity cooperative, First Fenway Cooperative, and bought
their building from a private owner. Sympathetic to tenants' fears that purchase of

the building by a private investor might force their displacement, the owner even

agreed

to accepting

a lower price from the tenant group.

14

In other locales, community concerns over displacement have stimulated public
actions that are also aimed at providing direct assistance

and resources to tenants.

For example,. in Washington, D.C., the local Department of Housing and Community

Development responded to tenants whose buildings were on the verge of being sold to

new investors. Between 1979 and 1983, the D.C. government helped 46 tenant
groups convert their buildings to cooperatives (about four-fifths of which are limited
equity) by providing loans

and technical

assistance.

Although a systematic

assessment of the program has not been made, a recent report claimed that physical
conditions have improved and that the buildings are safer and cleaner than they were

under the management of the previous owners. (Black, 1984).
Despite an increase in organizing around displacement issues, tenants in
private rental housing

who have organized housing initiatives have usually done so

only after the landlord has severely neglected the building and has abandoned most,
if not all,

management functions.

tax arrearages, or
It is

is in

the process of doing so.

not surprising that New York City, with the highest number of abandoned

buildings in the country,
for dealing

is

the site of the most varied and comprehensive approaches

with end-stage problems in the private rental housing stock. While some

of New York's programs are
for their creation

1982).

Often, the city has either acquired the property for

now administered through the city, much of the impetus

came from tenant and neighborhood organization (Hartman

et al.,

Two types of programs dealing with end-stage problems can be distinguished,

although conversion of rental housing to cooperatives is common

to both:

cooperative

conversion with and without sweat equity; and cooperative conversion with

management training.

15

Cooperative Conversion with and without Sweat Equity

New York's cooperative conversion and sweat equity rehabilitation programs
emerged as a result of tenant frustration with buildings that had been abandoned by
the private sector. Such rehabilitation programs developed, then, as part of the
tenants' efforts to salvage their homes. According to Robert Kolodny, the coop

conversion program emerged "primarily in response to the demands of tenants

who

had sustained their buildings for a period themselves but who needed the financing to
upgrade the buildings and the leverage

to

gain permanent control of them at nominal

cost" (Kolodny, 1981b, p. 56).

As of 1973, 37 projects with nearly 2,100 units were either completed or in the
process of rehabilitation and cooperative conversion.

Sumka and Blackburn (1982)

estimated that ultimately fewer than 50 buildings were converted to low-income
cooperatives in the entire city. While a formal evaluation of the program has not

been done, Kolodny (1981b) has offered the following summation:

Although many projects apparently failed, others prospered in very unlikely
circumstances. [In the coops that are doing well,] all the basic indicators of
effective management are there: low vacancy rates, limited turnover, long
waiting lists, good building maintenance, and general resident satisfaction,
(pp. 57-58)

The successes of many of these initiatives are particularly noteworthy in view of
the lack of any organized system of support for tenants. While

"it

that many could not hold on and sustain what they had started[,]

was not surprising
.

.

.

the potential for

a large-scale mutual aid strategy represented by these efforts was impressive"

(Kolodny, 1985).
In sweat equity-projects (also knows as urban homesteading), community

people donate their own labor to rehabilitate abandoned, usually city-owned,
buildings, which they eventually

own as cooperatives. Here the goals of housing and

tenant ownership are merged with the potential of job training and employment.

16

Despite the immediate appeal of this approach, sweat equity projects have been
difficult to

implement. As of 1981, between 500 and 1,000 units constituted the

New York City (Sumka and Blackburn,

entire sweat equity effort in

1982; Kolodny,

1985).

A nonprofit agency, the Urban Homesteading Assistance Board (UHAB), has
been pivotal in sustaining the sweat equity and coop conversion programs in New
York. Established in 1974,

UHAB provides tenant and community groups with

technical assistance and support, in addition to acting as an intermediary with the
city.

Cooperative Conversion with

Management Training

New York's "alternative management programs" have been described by
Kolodny (1981b). One of the most innovative, the Tenant Interim Lease Program,
involves direct management by tenants of city-owned buildings

if three-fifths

of the

residents sign a petition requesting it. After an 11-month trial period, tenants are
offered the opportunity to

assume ownership as a cooperative. The results have been

encouraging: rent collections have averaged

90% compared to 63% for other city-

managed properties, and tenant satisfaction has increased.

Further,

it

has been

found that buildings in this program require a lower expenditure by the city than
those

managed centrally by city staff (Hurwitz,

1982).

As of January

buildings with 3,470 units had been sold to tenant cooperatives.

1,

1985, 130

An additional 293

buildings were being managed by residents,with the hope that they would be

converted to coops (Kolodny, 1985).

Another innovative

New York program aimed at trying to salvage city-owned,

but formerly private, rental housing is the Community Management Program. In
this approach, a

community group enters into a contract with the city to manage

several buildings in

its

area. Buildings in this

17

program usually have fewer occupied

units than buildings in the Tenant Interim Lease Program and are more
deteriorated.

But the objectives of the two programs are similar:

to

improve

management through a tenant or community-based effort and to eventually enable
tenants to obtain ownership as a cooperative.

A total of 27 coops, with 485 units,

have already been created, with another 149 properties still in the program (Kolodny,
1985).

Despite the successes, problems do exist. Increasing the capacity of tenant and

community groups to carry out management functions is a slow, difficult process and
it is

not yet known whether long-term tenant or community ownership will be

achieved.

people

At the very least, however, such programs provide options for low-income

who are desperate for decent housing, while enabling community residents

and tenants to gain valuable experience in housing management.
Undoubtedly one of the successes of New York

City's cooperative conversion

programs is that they stimulated a federal demonstration. The "Section 510 demo,"

which derived its legal authority from 1978 amendments to the 1970 Housing Act,
authorized

HUD to determine the feasibility of expanding home ownership

opportunities in urban areas, giving special attention to the use of multifamily

housing. Seven cities were chosen to carry out multifamily housing rehabilitation
projects.

Under the direct control of the city,

private developers

and community

groups jointly rehabilitated buildings that were then transferred

to cooperative or

condominium ownership. Unlike the original model, pioneered in New York, the
demonstration did not include sweat equity. Instead,

it

depended on Section 8 or

other subsidies to lower the ultimate costs to tenants.

A recent evaluation of the "510 demo" concluded that none of the demonstration
projects

was an unqualified success. Even in the most successful project, low-income

cooperative ownership could only be achieved with subsidies for nearly two- thirds of
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the development costs and long-term Section 8 subsidies for a majority of the tenants

(Sumka, 1984). Yet, on balance, the report concluded:

The 510 demonstrations showed that a developer-community group partnership
It also showed that low-income cooperatives can be
could be made to work
but that
created to the benefit of the residents of inner-city neighborhoods
such projects will not bear fruit without the considerable effort and dedication of
the program staff. (Sumka, 1984)
.

In a second
cities

.

.

HUD demonstration, also based on New York's experiences, six

were selected to undertake sweat equity rehabilitation programs. Sumka and

Blackburn (1982) found that the results of the demonstration were mixed with only
two
is

cities establishing

significant that

ongoing multifamily homesteading programs. Thus, while

it

HUD attempted to replicate locally initiated ideas, the multifamily

sweat equity and coop conversion programs were not easily repeated in other areas.

Home Ownership and Home Ownership Support Programs
Two major types of community-based home ownership and home ownership
support programs can be identified: small-scale

home ownership and counseling

programs; and reinvestment funds.

Small-Scale Home Ownership and Counseling Programs

Because the federal government offered no home ownership opportunities for
lower income families until the late 1960s,
period organized their

many community groups prior to that

own home ownership programs. As early as

1945, an

Indianapolis settlement house initiated a sweat equity housing construction program

known

as Flanner House Homes, Inc. Through this program between 1950 and 1965,

366 families participated in the construction of their homes, with each family's work
assessed at between

25%-30% of the

Better Rochester Living,

total

Inc., offered

value of the house. Similarly, in 1964,

home ownership opportunities to lower income
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families, with rehabilitation
for their

work performed by the prospective owners in exchange

down payment. While a total of about 500 families were helped to buy

homes through this program, it took a huge amount of administrative and other
support services (much of it unpaid) to make these efforts work (Frieden and

Newman,

1970).

Partly based on the experiences of these early programs, the 1968 Housing Act

authorized subsidies for first- time low-income

home owners (Section 235). However,

a host of problems plagued the program and thousands of people eventually lost their

homes through foreclosure. One of the reasons for this tragic outcome was the lack of
counseling services for participants in the Section 235 program. But long before

i

problems emerged, drafters of the home ownership program were well aware of the

need for counseling. For example, a 1968 report issued by the U.S. House Committee
on Banking and Currency offered the following rationale:
Since many of the families who would be assisted have had little experience in
the proper care of a home and the budgeting of income to meet regular monthly
payments on a mortgage, this section T235] would authorize appropriate
counseling ... to assist these families in meeting their new responsibilities,
(p.

10)

Contrary to this recommendation, counseling never became an integral part of the

235 program and funding for counseling services was consistently omitted in HUD's
budget requests (Bratt, 1976; U.S. Committee on Government Operations, 1976).
Despite the lack of federal support, scores of voluntary community-based

counseling agencies attempted to provide the needed services.

A few, such as

Housing Now in Hartford, Connecticut, provided cash grants to

assist

with down

payment and closing costs. More often, however, counseling agencies offered no
direct financial assistance, concentrating only on providing information

1975a).

(HUD,

Some counseling programs also grew out of the growing default rate in the

Section 235 program and focused on default counseling
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(HUD,

1975a). Nevertheless,

without any significant support from the federal government, and with the weight of
other serious problems in the program, the voluntary counseling programs were

generally insufficient.

As mentioned above, thousands of homes were eventually

foreclosed and, since the mortgages were insured by the Federal

Housing Authority

(FHA-an agency within HUD), HUD was faced with the problem of how to dispose of
the units.
piled

It

took

HUD months, if not years, to dispose of foreclosed properties that

up in its inventory at an alarming rate.
In response to a landscape of boarded up,

HUD-owned properties, many

community organizations again attempted to develop home ownership opportunities
for

lower income residents. For example, Homeowners Rehab,

Inc., in

Cambridge,

Massachusetts, and the Worcester Cooperation Councils Home Improvement

Program in Worcester, Massachusetts, initiated variations on the earlier sweat
equity programs. Similar to their predecessors, these programs operate on extremely

small scales: less than a dozen families per year are assisted through each agency
(Siegenthaler, 1980). In Philadelphia,

Urban Homesteading Program in

community activists launched the Walk-In

1977, the goal of which

was to provide people with

homes by reusing some of the 40,000 abandoned buildings, many of them belonging to

HUD. HUD's opposition to the program slowly gave way to cooperation and by
February 1979-less than two years

after a squatting

campaign had begun- half of the

200 walk-in homesteaders had obtained legal ownership of their new houses when

HUD deeded the properties to them.
Reinvestment Funds
Redlining-the unwillingness of banks

to

grant home mortgages or loans in

certain areas of a city-has prompted some of the most widely publicized community-

based housing programs. Neighborhood Housing Services (NHS),which started in a
deteriorated, redlined section of Pittsburgh in 1968,
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was a resident-sponsored

8

reinvestment program. Through the neighborhood's own assessment of its problems,

a four- way partnership was forged between the residents, mortgage lenders, the city
(which committed to undertake a code-enforcement program and promised much

needed public services), and a foundation that provided a high risk pool of money for
potential borrowers

who were considered ineligible by the banks. By most accounts,

NHS has enjoyed considerable success.
the original Pittsburgh
also served as a

Not only has it been credited with stabilizing

NHS Neighborhood, (Ahlbrandt and Brophy, 1975), but it has

model for scores of additional NHS programs. As of 1983 there were

NHS organizations operating in 182 neighborhoods in 132 cities (Whiteside, 1983)
(also see note 6).

In addition to

NHS, several other locally-based mortgage funds have been

organized to combat disinvestment.

One important example is the Bedford-

Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation's mortgage pool, created in 1968. Responding to
a lack of mortgage money, the corporation
financial institutions in

managed to get commitments from 80

New York City to lend $65 million for FHA-insured and VA-

guaranteed mortgages for residents of the Bedford-Stuyvesant area of Brooklyn
(Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation, 1968).

One of the newest and largest reinvestment funds was launched in Chicago in
1984. Using the

Community Reinvestment Act as a lever, a coalition of community

groups, with the assistance of a nonprofit research and technical assistance agency,

the Woodstock Institute, negotiated a $120,000,000 loan commitment from the First

Chicago Corporation (Swift and Pogge, 1984).

Another noteworthy reinvestment program was created in Philadelphia in
1975. There, neighborhood residents joined together and protested the unavailability
of conventional mortgage financing throughout many sections of the city. In

response, 13 of the city's leading financial institutions agreed, in accordance with the
objectives of the Philadelphia

Mortgage Plan (PMP),
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to

evaluate and analyze

properties on a case-by-case basis (Long, 1977).

As of early 1979, PMP lenders had

made 4,167 loans with a default and foreclosure rate comparable to that of their
suburban portfolios (National Commission on Neighborhoods, 1979). Unlike the

NHS and the other reinvestment programs discussed here, PMP is controlled by the
banks-although community residents helped launch the program and do participate
through a review committee.

The preceding overview of community-based housing programs reveals the
diversity of approaches adopted by local groups, highlights

some of the complexity

and difficulty of pursuing a community-based housing strategy, and underscores a

common theme running throughout the examples: citizens who become involved with
community-based housing initiatives do so because they lack other viable options for
attaining decent, affordable shelter. The following section broadens the overview of

community-based housing by examining the past and present activities of

community-based housing developers.

ROOTS OF COMMUNITY-BASED HOUSING DEVELOPMENT
The current generation of community-based housing development groups has
several types of ancestors: the early housing philanthropists; the nonprofits of the

1960s; and the community-based sponsors in the 1970s

who formed limited

partnerships. Although some groups in the latter two categories overlapped

(i.e.,

nonprofits also operated in the 1970s) various types of community-based housing

groups have been dominant at different times over the last two decades.

The Early Philanthropists
Long before the formal entry of nonprofits on the housing scene
nineteenth century reformers saw the need

to limit the

in 1959,

some

amount of profit in low-

income housing. By the turn of the century, a small-scale movement had formed
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to

provide model tenement houses-"philanthropy plus 5%."9 The goals of the

were straightforward:

to provide decent

movement

housing for the poor while yielding a modest

profit for investors.

The legacy of the model tenement movement was mixed. On one hand, such
efforts pioneered design techniques that provided light

and

air to interior rooms,

an

"advance that was in sharp contrast to the tenements being built by speculators"
(Meyerson, Terrett, and Wheaton, 1962,

p. 293).

On the other hand, some "model"

tenements turned into slums that were as bad as any produced by the private market.
Further, according to Lawrence Veiller, a prominent housing reformer of the period,
speculative builders had been able to produce

were highly objectionable:

many more buildings, most of which

"for every 13 people

tenements, 1,000 others have been condemned

Friedman, 1968,

p. 86).

who have been provided with model

to live in

insanitary ones" (quoted in

Catherine Bauer, another key reformer, pointed out that the

economics of the model tenement plan were ultimately unworkable. The model
builders wanted "to provide good dwellings on an 'economic' basis at a price which

everyone could pay.

.

.

without disturbing or even questioning any part of the current

social-economic system" (quoted in Friedman, 1968,

the century,

it

was acknowledged that decent,

p. 87).

Thus, even at the turn of

low-cost housing was a goal that ran

counter to the economic realities of housing production. Housing has always been

,

expensive to build and, by definition, low-income households often have inadequate
resources with which to pay the real cost of shelter.

The First Nonprofit Developers: 1960s
From the federal government's entry into subsidized housing in 1937 until
1959, housing for low-income households was produced and managed through local
public housing authorities. However, as described earlier, in 1959 subsidies were

made available to private sponsors of publicly supported housing through Section 202
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and later Section 221

(d)(3)

and 236. Although only nonprofits were

eligible to

sponsor Section 202 housing, the subsequent programs also permitted and

encouraged participation by private for-profit developers.

Based primarily on the experiences with these programs during the 1960s,

,

nonprofit sponsorship of multifamily subsidized housing acquired a generally

negative reputation.

groups with

little

Many well-meaning but inexperienced church, civic, and union

prior experience in housing were often unable to maintain

developments once they built them. In addition, many nonprofit groups were lured
into the projects

by for-profit builders,

contractors,

out after they pocketed their fees (Keyes, 1971;
circumstances,

it is

and consultants who often bailed

HUD,

1972). In view of these

not surprising that nonprofit projects failed at two to four times

the rate of for-profit developments (GAO, 1978; Friedland and MacRae, 1979).

In addition to the unique problems confronting nonprofits, some structural
defects in the Section 221 (d)(3)

and 236 programs

also proved troublesome.

Probably

the most significant flaws were the incentive for developers to underestimate

operating costs (in order to enable projects to appear feasible under the terms of the

subsidy programs), the lack of any requirement for funds to be set aside to deal with

unforeseen expenses, and a subsidy formula that could not increase
resources were needed

(BRA and BUO,

1973;

HUD,

1973;

HUD,

if

additional

1978b;

GAO,

1978).

When utility costs skyrocketed in the early 1970s due to the oil crisis, owners of
subsidized housing were faced with several difficult options for trying to meet

increased operating expenses: raise rents, decrease maintenance and
services, cut into profits, or default on

chosen to try
less

to

management

mortgage payments. Different strategies were

keep the projects afloat but, overall, the results were grim: by 1978

than one third of the subsidized developments were financially sound (HUD,

1978b).
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Although

all

owners of subsidized housing found themselves "between a rock

and a hard place," the dilemma for nonprofit sponsors was even more problematic.

With limited assets, nonprofits didn't even have the option of using some of their own
resources to

make ends meet.

Further, the options of either reducing maintenance or

increasing rents was antithetical to the goals of the nonprofit groups.

As one

community sponsor of subsidized housing who was 15 months behind in mortgage
payments put it, <rWe had to make a decision, do you let people stay cold or do you pay
the mortgage? Who[m] are

Urban Planning Aid,

we to serve, the government or the tenants?" (quoted in

1973,

p. 41).

Thus, when faced with the decision of whether to

provide housing services to tenants or to pay debt service to financial institutions,

some nonprofits chose to manage the developments for as long as they could and to
allow the projects to default. This suggests that an important reason behind the

higher financial failure rate

for the nonprofits

was their desire to operate the

buildings in accordance with their original goals, despite their limited resources.

Although

it

appears that the social commitment of the nonprofits may have

created a situation that

left

them vulnerable to criticism,

this

commitment also

produced a record that had many unequivocal benefits. In terms of volume of units
produced, ability to reach low-income people, rentals charged, average

number of

bedrooms/unit, willingness to undertake projects in urban renewal areas, and quality
of management, the early nonprofit housing movement can boast

some real successes.

Consider the following:

•

By June 1970 nonprofits had sponsored about 28% of all units built under
the Section 221(d)(3)

•

BMIR and 236 programs (Keyes, 197D.10

Nonprofit sponsors used the rent supplement and the leased housing

programs proportionally more frequently than for-profit developers,
thereby making units more affordable and available to lower income
people (Disario,1969; Keyes,

197D.H
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A comparison of nonprofit and for-profit developments in Boston revealed

•

that tenants in the latter paid lower average rentals (Disario, 1969).

The above study also found that nonprofit developments had more three,

•

four,

and five bedroom apartments (Disario, 1969).

Research conducted by HUD disclosed that projects built by nonprofit

•

sponsors served needier families than those built by limited-dividend
sponsors

•

(HUD,

1975b).l2

Based on an evaluation in 24

cities,

nonprofit sponsors of 221 (d)(3)

housing were more likely to undertake projects in urban renewal areas

than for-profit developers (Keyes, 1971).

Many community-based sponsors openly confronted the toughest housing

•

issues: central city rehabilitation, utilization of minority contractors

developers, and involvement of tenants in

and

management decisions (Keyes,

1971).

The Urban Institute found that cooperatively owned and nonprofit

•

housing was, in general, more effectively managed than
developments
It

(cited in

GAO,

1978).

must also be kept in mind that the

an institutional

setting,

for-profit

early nonprofit housing groups operated in

which makes these successes even more impressive.

Although the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 included two sections
explicitly

aimed at assisting nonprofit groups,

HUD did not aggressively administer

the programs and neither was fully utilized. Section 106

(a)

authorized funding to

agencies to provide information, advice, and technical assistance to nonprofit groups

involved with housing construction or rehabilitation for low- or moderate-income
families; Section 106 (b) provided "seed
It

was not until 1972 that HUD

money" loans to nonprofit housing sponsors.

set aside $1 million to fund the Section

106

(a)

program. Interestingly enough, this money came from the $6.7 million of so-called
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.

"excess" funds in the Section 106 (b) revolving loan fund

(HUD,

1975b).

HUD's

unsupportive attitude toward these programs was also revealed when they
questioned whether Section 106
private sources of funds.

.

.

(b)

seed money was necessary "in addition to

[and whether the reasons for Section 106

sufficient to justify a $150,000 a year

(b)

.

.

were]

program" (HUD, 1975b, 21).l3

Although HUD's unwillingness to actively support Section 106 only adds
another page in the long history of the agency's nonconsumer orientation,

it is

noteworthy that lawmakers foresaw the need for funding and technical assistance for
nonprofit housing sponsors. If Section 106 had been funded and used extensively, two

key ingredients of a community-based housing system would have been put in
However, as it turned out, technical assistance and funding to cover start-up

place.

costs

had to be aggressively pursued by nonprofits because they could not be obtained
through federal appropriations. The lack of funding for these programs contributed
to the overall

impression of a fragmented, nonsystem in which nonprofit community-

based housing activities were forced to operate. With skimpy financial resources and

few outside supports, many nonprofit groups got "burned out" after finishing one
development. The knowledge that the group acquired was rarely used again and new

groups wanting to produce housing would start at the beginning again, in essence
"reinventing the wheel" each time.

A few community groups, however, did depart from this general pattern.
instance,

For

Community Development Corporations (CDCs), which were well funded

through the Special Impact Amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act of 1966,

and later through Title VII of the Community Services Act of 1974, have had more
resources available to

them and have been considerably more permanent. Another

group of community-based organizations that were supported by the old Office of

Economic Opportunity as well as the Model Cities program were the Housing

Development Corporations (HDCs). As forerunners to many of the community-based
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housing groups that exist today, the early HDCs represented significant initial
efforts to institutionalize the technical

and financial resources needed to make

nonprofit housing development possible (Keyes, 1971). Nevertheless, they probably

revealed as much about what was wrong with the

way in which community-based

housing development was operating as what was right.

A major evaluation of HDCs

summed up the situation: "They are saddled with goals and objectives that are far
beyond their resources to achieve" (quoted in Keyes, 1971,

Nonprofits

Form Limited Partnerships:

p. 169).

1970s

Starting in the early 1970s community-based housing sponsors, which up to
that time had been nonprofit groups, began to form limited partnerships with forprofit developers.

The push for this new form of ownership grew out of the two key

problems faced by the early nonprofits: inadequate financial reserves and a lack of
technical expertise.

The concept of limited partnership was uniquely suited to address these
First,

issues.

by entering into such an arrangement, the community sponsor could attract

the participation of a for-profit developer as a co-general partner. The experience of
for-profit developers

who had proven "track records" was enormously helpful in

negotiating the complexities of the development process. The second advantage of
limited partnerships

was that they could enjoy substantial financial benefits, thereby

creating reserves for construction overruns or for future

A limited partnership works this way:
owners of a housing development can

sell

management expenses.

through a process known as syndication,

shares to wealthy investors (limited

partners) who, in turn, enjoy significant tax savings. All rental property
"depreciates" for tax purposes and these paper losses shelter portions of an owner's

other income.

By definition, nonprofits have no taxable income that needs sheltering,

therefore the depreciation losses that flow from a project are essentially wasted as
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long as it is owned solely by a nonprofit group.

If,

however, the nonprofit forms a

limited partnership, the limited partners "buy into" the project and then, as partial

owners, are entitled to a percentage of the depreciation generated by the project. The
buy-in funds are shared by the general partners-the nonprofit group and the
profit partner.

The latter sees the money as a key source of profit and motivation for

participating in the project; while the nonprofit uses the

increased costs, as a

with which

for-

money as a cushion against

way to provide the project with more amenities, or as seed money

new projects can be launched. The decision to develop housing as a

nonprofit or through a limited partnership depends on the goals and particular
situation facing a community-based housing group. 14

One of the most successful community-based housing groups that has used the
limited partnership approach

is

IBA, Inquilinus Borriculas en Action (Puerto Rican

Tenants in Action), located in Boston. IBA has its roots in a protest organization that

came together in the late 1960s demanding a community-oriented use for a parcel of

Urban Renewal land. Eventually, IBA won the right to develop the land and
constructed almost 400 units of subsidized housing and rehabilitated another 200
units.

During the late 1970s and early 1980s most community-based housing groups
benefited enormously from the availability of Section 8

Substantial Rehabilitation subsidies.

221

(d)(3)

and 236 programs, Section

in operating expenses.

New Construction and

A significant improvement over the Section

8's

funding formula took into account increases

With HUD committing to pay the

market rental" and 30% of a tenant's income

difference

between a "fair

(also see note 5) financial difficulties

and operating shortfalls were virtually guaranteed not to occur. However, as part of
President Reagan's cutbacks in domestic spending, the Section 8

New Construction

and Substantial Rehabilitation programs are not receiving new funding. This phaseout of federal subsidies for housing production will have serious consequences, both

30

because of the loss of needed units and because of the inability of fledging community-

based housing groups

to sustain

themselves during this dry period.

Precise figures on the accomplishments of the present generation of community

groups involved with housing rehabilitation and construction are not available at
this time.

One study found that 46 groups had produced 5,290 units of rehabilitated

housing and 872 units of new housing (Marshall, 1981).

A 1983 survey of

neighborhood development organizations found that 54 groups had rehabilitated
7,742 units and constructed 1,388 units of new housing (Cohen and Kohler, 1983). If
there

was no overlap between the samples (which is unlikely) and if the two studies

did not omit too

many groups (which is also unlikely) we could estimate that

approximately 100 community groups have been responsible for building or
rehabilitating

some 15,000 units of housing. Whether this figure represents an

underestimate or an exaggeration

is less

important than providing a rough idea of

how much-or how little-housing has been produced or rehabilitated by communitybased organizations.

Although we do not have complete data on the
housing activity,

it is

level of community-based

safe to conclude that these efforts address only a small fraction

of the overall low-income housing need. Nevertheless, the current generation of

community-based housing developers appears to hold real potential

for

significant contributions. It should also be underscored that modern

making more

community-

based housing groups are very different from earlier nonprofit housing sponsors. For
instance,

more modern groups are generally financially sounder and more

knowledgeable about housing development, in large part because of their association
with private developers in limited partnership arrangements. They are also less
likely to quit after one development, often launching additional housing

service projects,

and are becoming more professionalized with

staffs

and

social

competent in

housing finance, development, and management. Finally, another important
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difference between community-based housing groups in the 1970s

predecessors

is

and 80s and their

that the former have been the beneficiaries of resources provided by a

handful of organizations operating at the national,

state,

and local levels. At the

national level, private nonprofit groups such as the Enterprise Foundation, the Local
Initiatives Support Corporation, the Center for

Community Change, and the

National Housing Law Project have been providing significant technical and
financial resources to community-based housing initiatives. Several cities, notably

Boston,

New York, Chicago and Minneapolis, also have at least one public or

nonprofit agency that assists community-based housing groups. Finally, at the state
level,

Massachusetts has pioneered a series of programs that has begun to emerge as

a support system for community-based housing activities. These programs will be
discussed after the following assessment of the community-based housing strategy.

ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNITY-BASED HOUSING STRATEGY
Returning to the

criteria listed at the

beginning of this paper, some important

strengths and weaknesses of the community-based housing strategy emerge.

Ability to Provide Direct

Housing Assistance

One key advantage of community-based housing programs has been their
ability to directly address specific housing problems. For example, residents

who

were confronted with a lack of mortgage or rehabilitation money in their

,

neighborhoods initiated reinvestment programs that specifically addressed their
problem. Similarly, tenants who were dissatisfied with conditions in their subsidized
buildings formed their own management corporations that also tackled the problems

head-on. In these ways people have dealt directly with the housing problems facing

them, and their achievements have been tangible.
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.

The most recent generation of community-based housing developments have
not yet been assessed in terms of the quality of housing produced. Yet the anecdotal
evidence

is

extremely provocative and suggests the potential inherent in this

strategy. For

example columnist Neil Peirce has enthusiastically described the

design of IBA's housing:

Ascend to the roof of the high rise building for the elderly in Villa Victoria
and an astounding view awaits you. Immediately below are the Hispanic Plaza
and distinctive pitched roofs, the bright yellow, orange and brown colors of the
townhouses of Villa Victoria-proof that a housing project doesn't need to look
like one. The sense of territoriality is overwhelming when one walks across the
central plaza, with its bright Puerto Rican mural, and strolls through the new
.

looped streets

.

.

.

.

(1983).

Despite this glowing vignette and the directness of its approach, the limited
scope and small scale of community-based housing programs raise the question of

whether the strategy could substantially

alleviate our overall housing problems.

Thus far in this paper outcomes of various programs have been described
quantitatively,

whenever possible,

housing has been

affected.

in order to underscore

For example, although

how much (or how little)

New York City touts the most

successful programs for dealing with abandoned multifamily housing, the

number of

buildings that have actually been fixed up and/or are under tenant management or
control is small. Similarly, while

IBA has been praised for its magnificent housing

developments in the South End, the number of units built or rehabilitated is
minuscule, particularly when one considers the demand. In 1981, when

announced that 190 new rental units were

IBA

available, thousands of people applied.

To sum up, although community-based housing programs have been successful
in directly addressing and alleviating housing problems, their ability to perform on

anything but a small scale has not been proven. Of course,

if substantial

financial

and technical supports were provided it is possible that more sweeping achievements
could be realized.
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Potential for Producing Social and

Community Benefits

One of the most important strengths of community-based housing programs is
their ability to yield positive impacts not only directly related to housing, but also in

terms of improving overall living conditions. For example in addition

to providing

good housing, IBA runs programs for the elderly, provides day care services, and

manages a closed circuit television station for residents of the development. As
Mario Clavel, an IBA staff member noted,
top of one another to build a house.

there-from

all aspects.

Similarly, the

It's

'It's

not just a matter of placing bricks on

dealing with those

who are going to live

We are not dealing with buildings but people" (Soulos, 1981).

community relations director of the West Harlem Community

Organization observed that "Aside from community management, we provide lots of
other services to tenants

[W]e're putting together a

manual of services that are

scattered all over the city that some people just don't know they're there-dental

health care at places other than a hospital, for instance. We're

merchants to clean up the

and

now trying to get the

streets, the sidewalks, the storefronts,

pressure mobile and polio vaccination notices, for example"

so

and to put up blood

(HUD, 1979, p.

46).

Commenting on the expansion of tenant-management corporations into other
types of socially oriented services, Robert Kolodny has written:

The problems of housing a population overwhelmingly made up of welfaredependent, female-headed households confronted the TMC's with the need to
rethink their roles as managers. To a far greater extent than most other public
St. Louis projects have developed programs in
education; recreation; health;
special care for children and the elderly; job
training; and direct employment. (1981a, p. 137)

housing in the country, the

.

.

.

Based upon observations such as these, Kolodny has concluded that "Housing

improvement may not, in itself, be the most significant result of expanded consumer
roles in housing production, operation,

and ownership" (1981a,
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p. 142).

Community-based housing programs also have a potential for serving as an
anchor in neighborhoods that are going through gentrification. As many urban
neighborhoods become increasingly attractive

to

middle and upper income people,

thousands of longtime residents are losing their homes and businesses. As demand
increases for residential and commercial space, landlords often raise rents

dramatically, sell their buildings to speculators

condominiums. Regardless of the

tactic used, the

the same: their neighborhoods out-price
in those neighborhoods

or, in

where there

is

some

cases, convert to

net result for lower income people

is

them and they are forced to move. However,

community-based housing activity, residents

may face a decreased risk of displacement.

For example, IBA, which operates in an

area of Boston that has become a prime "gentrifying" neighborhood, serves an an

important stabilizing force by providing decent low-cost housing to community
people.

Once a community-based housing group has gained recognition for

competence in housing development or management,

it is

unlikely that any major

program or plan could be initiated in that area without the knowledge of the

community group. In this way the housing initiative can serve as a "concrete"
reminder that the group must be bargained with, considered, and consulted

whenever the

city or

any other entity begins

to

have designs on or for that area.

Thus, one can see how a strong "bottom up" group can nurture additional community-

based projects and at the same time ensure that any "top-down" planning or

development efforts that do not take their interests into account will face
considerable obstacles.

Potential for Producing Benefits to Individuals

Another important benefit of community-based housing programs is their
ability to produce significant psychological benefits for the individuals involved.

Although very

little

systematic evidence

is

available on this effect, community-based
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housing programs should provide participants with increased enjoyment, security,

and a sense of empowerment. One resident in one of Jubilee Housing's buildings
described her perceptions this way:

took over? Well,

with Jubilee
the

I

"How has the building changed since Jubilee

'

would say it is much better because we work together; we work

to get the building in better shape.

work and we are getting along O.K."

Now everybody takes their share of

(Jubilee Housing, p. 13).

Similarly, an elated Philadelphia squatter who obtained legal ownership of her

home stated: "Words can't explain how I feel. We have plenty of room. We're happy.
If people

were allowed to get a home

be so much vandalism

how it was before"

to fix up,

something that's theirs, there wouldn't

Housing is the main issue for everyone and I won't forget

(quoted in

Hartman et al.,

1982, p. 69). And, according to Barbara

Ward, an expert on human settlements:
[T]he policy of encouraging home ownership can be used effectively to help
poorer citizens. It does more than simply provide them with secure shelter.
Even deeper needs are at issue here. It has been said of the poorest citizens,
sadly but with too much truth, that they are "the people whose plans never
work out"
[They] feel utterly powerless in the face of a system which,
Perhaps the
private or public, seems simply to push them around
fundamental point in tenants organizing themselves for action is not simply to
selfget themselves their own homes. It is the very act of organization.
organization can be the creative answer. It turns the flow of authority back to
the citizen, however impoverished. It can be the beginning of a plan that
actually works out
(1976, p. 116).
.

.

.

.

.

Community-based housing programs can

also heighten the political

of people as they "fight the system" to institute change and create

new programs.

According to Gale Cincotta, chair of National Peoples Action, 'The
in this country are bankrupt.

awareness

political leaders

The answers, the leadership and the guts to win will

come from us. [N]o one who is out there organizing throughout this land expects to be
rescued

We know that the only way we survive is by helping ourselves" (1981).
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Ease of Implementation
Community-based housing programs are

clearly major undertakings

and are

Much of the difficulty stems from the fact that community

difficult to carry out.

groups facing serious housing problems often find themselves "reinventing the

wheel" and negotiating their way, unassisted, through the complexities of the
housing system. Financial and technical assistance are especially necessary, but are
usually scarce.
in

Where technical assistance has been more readily available, such as

New York and Boston, it has been crucial to the success of housing initiatives.
Thus,

it

must be underscored that the words "community-based" do not mean

By definition, lower income people

that funding from other sources

is

require public assistance

are to attain a decent home and suitable living

environment.

Any high-level proclamation in support of local initiatives is absurd as

long as the phrase
easy

it

if they

unnecessary.

is

equated with self-funding. Robert Schur (1980) warned

how

would be for city government officials to lull themselves into believing that

simply allowing people

to

own and manage tax foreclosed structures is sufficient. He

also noted that if technical support as well as financial resources are withheld, sweat

equity programs could turn into a form of "lemon socialism." Similarly, Homefront,

New York's Citywide Action Group Against Neighborhood Destruction and for LowRent Housing, has charged that the most serious problem with the sweat equity
cooperative conversion programs

is

that "they place most of the responsibility for

housing improvement on individuals and
resources,

local

communities, which have the least

and get the government (which has the resources)

Hartman et al.,

1982,

off the

hook" (quoted in

p. 67).

Benefits versus Costs

There

is insufficient

information on community-based housing programs to

perform a systematic analysis of costs versus benefits. Moreover, even with more
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quantitative data, a full assessment would be difficult because so

many of the

benefits of community-based housing are qualitative in nature. Specifically, the

array of nonhousing benefits that are enjoyed by residents and tenants, as well as the
positive impacts on the

community, are key strengths of the community-based

housing strategy, but are not quantifiable.

Potential for Replication

Community-based housing programs have served as a model to the federal
government for national demonstrations. The most significant example of this is the
Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation which was designed to
setting up their

own Neighborhood Housing Services Programs, thereby replicating

the original Pittsburgh initiative. Similarly, although on

with somewhat less success,

City's multifamily

much smaller scales and

HUD has launched both tenant management

demonstrations modeled after the

York

assist locales in

St.

Louis TMC and demonstrations based on

New

homesteading experiences. This indicates that locally-based

housing programs are not only able

to address the

problems of one community, but

are also likely to provide solutions for similar housing problems in other parts of the
country.

Although community-based programs can be
duplicating successful programs

is

in its infancy.

replicated, the "state of the art" in

A great deal more needs to be

understood about the types of programs that are the best models,

how these models

can be adapted to other locales whether the replicated programs initiated in a "top-

down" manner can truly be labeled "community-based," and what type of agency or
level or

government is best suited to

assist in the replication of community-based

housing initiatives.
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Ability to

Address Root Causes of the Problem

Although community-based housing programs may heighten aspects of political
awareness discussed earlier they probably do not do very much toward addressing

fundamental causes of housing problems. They generally do not,

for instance,

attempt to alter institutional relationships or change traditional business patterns
within the private housing industry. While

it

may be a significant step for a financial

institution to participate in a special mortgage loan

program that has been launched

by a community group, that involvement does not guarantee that it will
groups or change

its

assist other

overall lending practices.

Some of the most pointed criticisms of the community-based housing strategy
are, in fact,

based on this shortcoming. For example, Homefront has been

critical of

the sweat equity cooperative conversion programs because of their implicit

acceptance of the market system. According to that organization, "By working

through these programs, communities implicitly accept the proposition that tenants

must solve

their

own housing problems

To the extent that they believe they must

learn to survive in the market, they do not demand the replacement of an exploitative

market by government-provided housing" (quoted in Hartman et al., 1982,
This
it is

is

p. 67).

a legitimate position that must be taken seriously. Yet at the same time

not easy for individuals facing serious shelter problems to

sit

back and do

nothing to meet their immediate needs. One can "demand the replacement of an
exploitative market" all one likes but there

is

no guarantee

(let

alone even a good

chance) that this will result in a roof over one's head. Most community-based housing

programs emerge from deep frustration and desperation. People usually embark on
the difficult course of trying to solve their

own housing problems as a last resort.

In conclusion, despite the obstacles and limited resources, community-based

housing programs have shown the capacity

to

housing problems. Overall, there does appear
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grapple with and solve some difficult
to

be significant potential in the

community-based housing strategy. One can visualize a comprehensive support
system for this approach that would provide the needed technical and financial
resources, thereby

making explicit the government's role in providing housing, while

enabling residents

to create their

own community-based programs.

BUILDING A MODEL SUPPORT SYSTEM

FOR COMMUNITY-BASED HOUSINGS
A

model support system would provide funding and technical assistance and

create an evaluation

and information sharing network.

Funding
The need for adequate funding is obviously a crucial ingredient for the success
of community-based housing activities. In general, three distinct types of financial

resources are necessary.

The first, seed money, is needed to cover organizational

expenses. In order for a community group to initiate a housing program, early

funding to cover start-up costs is essential. Grants for initial operating expenses
enable groups to formally establish an organization, develop specific strategies, and
line

up other resources appropriate to the

specific

development to be undertaken.

Seed money, often obtained through grants, covers such expenses as office rental,
secretarial assistance,

limitations

and a director's salary. Since these grants carry time

and dollar ceilings, they encourage groups to move on to development

projects as quickly as possible.

A second type of funding necessary for successful community-based housing
activities is construction

and debt financing for project implementation. Although

the cheapest and most direct way of subsidizing housing is probably through outright grants, the high short-term costs of this approach
political reasons.

make it an unlikely option for

Thus, financial resources for construction loans and long-term debt
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financing are needed. There are at least three ways in which such funds can be
obtained: through a publicly capitalized

bank specifically set up for this purpose;

through a private financial institution with or without some type of federal mortgage
guarantee; and through a special
in the following manner.

"GNMA-FNMA" program. The third option works

The Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA)

makes a commitment to purchase a certain amount of below-market, interest rate
mortgages originated by community-based housing groups. These loans are then sold
to the Federal

with

National Mortgage Association

(FNMA) at prevailing market rates,

GNMA providing a subsidy equal to the difference between the yields on the

market rate and the below-market rate transactions.

The final component of the funding package for successful community-based
housing activities is direct subsidies to individual units and households that would
lower final rental

costs.

Such subsidies are similar to those available through the

Section 8 program.

In short

what is needed in terms of funding is a two-pronged subsidy program:

one that encourages the production or supply of housing and the other that provides
individuals with extra buying power to

make units more affordable.

Technical Assistance
Technical assistance

is

the second major ingredient needed for a comprehensive

community-oriented housing system. Those in need of such services can be broken

down into three groups of actors.

Community organizations are, logically, the first group needing technical
assistance in the community-based housing system. Over the past few years a great

deal has been learned about the types of technical assistance needed by local

organizations that are attempting to launch neighborhood development projects.

Several types of "hands on" assistance are valuable to neighborhood development
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organizations including: proposal writing and assisting with outsiders, especially

funding sources; legal assistance; accounting; defining board and staff roles and
training board members; and organizational structuring (Mayer and Blake, 1981). In
addition, information specifically related to housing must be available, such as:

the housing development process works;

how

what subsidy programs are available and

how they work; and how to negotiate with key actors including financial institutions,
architects, lawyers, city officials, syndication firms, contractors,

and co-general

partners.

A community-based housing group that has successfully built or taken over the
management of a housing development may need assistance running the project,
especially in such areas as tenant selection, lease enforcement

and ongoing

management, and maintenance. As the group matures, it may also need help in
areas like assessing whether or not it should undertake additional developments and

learning how it can provide nonhousing services

to better

meet the needs of the local

community.
In order to institutionalize a high quality of technical assistance, a national
technical assistance organization could be established.

an organization would be

to

One of the functions of such

help locales set up city- wide or regional technical

assistance agencies modeled after Greater Boston

Community Development and the

Urban Homesteading Assistance Board that would, in turn, provide information,
advice,

and technical support to neighborhood housing organizations. These

independent local organizations would serve as intermediaries between the

community group and other public and private

actors.

In addition to providing technical assistance to the community-based housing
agencies, training

and educational programs would have to be launched for other

important participants in the community-based housing process.
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Two of the most

important actors are city government and the local business community, notably
financial institutions.

Many aspects of community-based housing activities require a high level of
commitment and support by local government. For example, buildings and land that
are in tax arrears can either become enormous resources to

community groups or

significant blights on a neighborhood. Unless the city understands

how it can

quickly identify such properties and sees the benefits of allowing community-based

groups

to

take

uneconomical

title

of them, usable units can quickly

to repair. Cities

become extremely costly or

need to be taught how early warning systems operate

and must learn from other locales how the necessary supports can be provided to
community-based housing efforts.
Financial institutions and other private entities also need assistance in

understanding how community-based housing groups operate and how their
cooperation can both assist the local activity and create

new markets for their goods

or services. In this sense, the private sector needs to appreciate
interest may be

how their own self-

enhanced by supporting community-based housing activities.

Evaluation and Information Sharing Network

The

third major component of the support system for community-based housing

involves the creation of a communication and information dissemination network. It
is crucial

projects,

that community-based groups, as well as

all

other actors involved in such

have opportunities to share information and experiences. In addition,

research on community-based housing activities and evaluations of ongoing

programs are

critical ingredients to

a successful community-based housing system.

Clearly the support system for community-based housing programs outlined

above would not be evaluated favorably in the current political climate. Quite
simply, this proposal

is

diametrically opposed to the views articulated by President
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Reagan, his recent Commission on Housing, and HUD
looks to

for the following reasons: it

community groups, rather than to the for-profit private sector, to play a key

role in housing; it

assumes that everyone has a right to decent, affordable

shelter;

and it calls for a new federal commitment to meet this goal. Given these
circumstances, the logic and proven record of the community-based approach to

housing can only be viewed at this point as a potential national strategy. At the very
most,

we can look forward to a time when these ideas will receive public support. At

the very least,

we must continue to keep the vision alive.

EVOLUTION OF THE MASSACHUSETTS SUPPORT
SYSTEM FOR COMMUNITY-BASED HOUSING
The Community Economic Development Movement
During the

late 1960s, the needs of inner-city, low-income

to receive increased attention.

programs left a mixed legacy

Although the federal community development

for

urban neighborhoods and their residents, they did

serve to focus attention on problems of the
for criticism, as

neighborhoods began

cities.

Urban renewal was an easy target

thousands of low-income units were

were demolished. In their place, luxury apartments,

lost

and whole "urban villages"

offices,

and civic centers became

the concrete symbols of the inequities of the "urban/Negro removal" program.

The federal community development programs that followed, "War on Poverty"
and "Model

Cities,"

although more focused on trying to assist low-income

neighborhoods, were often viewed as only token improvements.Whether due to
inefficiency or over-ambitiousness,

addition, although

program goals rarely lived up to expectations. In

"community control" and "maximum feasible participation"

became the buzz words of the mid-1960s, lawmakers gave ambiguous messages about
whether neighborhood residents or the
reins of power.

local chief executive

would actually hold the

As inevitable controversies arose, the neighborhood emerged as a

significant locus of activity, if not control.

Whether community groups coalesced to
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protest urban renewal plans or to vie for power with city hall, one of the clear

outcomes was a new awareness of the problems facing the inner city.
Consciousness about poor urban dwellers in general, and blacks in particular,

was raised by a second key factor: the civil rights movement. Although there were
no geographical boundaries to inequality, the plight of blacks was almost

synonymous with inner-city problems. This link became fixed when, in the summers
of 1966

and 1967, frustrations in black communities gave way to full-scale urban

riots.

At about the same time, a third set of events was unfolding that also
contributed to an increased awareness of the problems facing urban neighborhoods,
particularly in older industrialized states, such as Massachusetts. Traditional

manufacturing firms began
part as a

to close

down and relocate

to

Sun Belt locations, in large

way to attract cheaper nonunion labor. The result for cities that were losing

such firms was often disastrous, as tax bases declined and

fiscal crises

became a

major topic of concern.

By the early 1970s community activists, some political leaders, and a handful of
academics began

to see potential in a completely

new urban agenda. Two positive

approaches emerged: black capitalism and community economic development. The

former emphasized helping black entrepreneurs enter the economic mainstream,
while the latter focused on a collective, community-based response

viewed local control as the

to

poverty that

critical ingredient.

The Massachusetts Community Economic Development Program: 1978-1983
In Massachusetts, the community economic development movement received
significant support from a group of local politicians, activists,
coalition

was crucial

components. The

to the creation of the state

first

and academics. This

program, which consisted of three

was the Community Development Finance Corporation
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(CDFC). Following more than a year of negotiation and debate, a state bill was
signed in 1975 that created the corporation. In exchange for giving CDFC the
proceeds from the sale of $10 million worth of state general obligation bonds, the
state received all of the agency's

common stock, thereby becoming its sole owner.

CDFC's mandate was to function

as a development bank that would

make equity

investments, which are relatively risky and difficult to obtain, as well as loans that

would be retired by debt financing. CDFC's funds were to be targeted to Community

Development Corporations (CDCs) operating in blighted areas.

Very briefly, a CDC

is

a nonprofit organization controlled by local residents to

help guide the improvement of an economically distressed area. Membership in a

CDC is open to all adults living in the specific geographic area and the majority of its
board members must be elected by its membership. Other board members may be
appointed, but they must be public officials or represent other nonprofit groups

operating in the area. Although

all

CDCs share the broad objective of enabling

residents to exercise greater control over the local economy and improving the

quality of goods and services in their communities, the specific goals and activities

launched by a

CDC can be quite variable.

The requirement that CDFC channel its funds through CDCs gave clear
support to the view that projects should be controlled by and operated for the benefit
of community residents. In

summary, CDFC's operation was unique because of its

willingness to take equity positions in risky ventures,

economically distressed areas, and
client, the

its restriction to

its explicit

focus on

working with only one type of

CDC.

Due to a legal delay in the sale of CDFC bonds, the first investments were not

made until

1978.

Even then, by the end of 1981 only 21 investments with a value of

$3.6 million had been made. There were several reasons for the
difficulties. First, despite the original

CDFC's early

assumption that lack of capital was a major
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detriment to development in depressed areas, there was relatively
funds. In part this

little

demand for

was because there were only a handful of CDCs in the

start of CDFC's operation. Further, the

state at the

CDCs that were functional had a great deal

of difficulty attracting experienced staff and locating skilled entrepreneurs

who could

put together sound business ventures.

Another key problem during CDFC's early years was that many of the original
investments ended in failure. Out of the

first

25 ventures financed, 14 were closed

and liquidated and two had to be reorganized; the remaining nine loans had either
been repaid or were current as of early 1984. According to Nancy Nye, vice president
of CDFC, 'This compares reasonably well to the SBA's [Small Business

Administration! documented
considering that all the

55% failure rate of small business, particularly

CDFC ventures are located in distressed areas and by the

very nature of the investment are higher risk than a general sample" (Nye, 1984).

Along with the slowness in making investments and the high rate of failure of
the early loans,

CDFC also had a disappointing record in stimulating job creation. As

of the end of 1983 the agency could claim that only 474 jobs

retained through

CDFC investments (CDFC,

had been created or

1984).

The second component of the Massachusetts Community Economic
Development Program was the Community Economic Development Assistance
Corporation (CEDAC). The need for a
assistance to

new agency that could provide technical

CDCs was acknowledged by Massachusetts lawmakers even before

CDFC realized that demand for its capital was weak and that there were only a
relatively small

number of CDCs who were eligible to receive investments.

was created in 1978 to provide

technical assistance to

CDCs.

Specifically,

CEDAC

CEDAC's

main functions were to assist groups in becoming CDCs, and then to assist them in
the initial stages of economic development planning and in the final preparation of

business plans for

CDFC financing.
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CEDAC has always been much less financially secure than the well-capitalized
CDFC. Technical assistance is a "softer" type of activity than financing and it is
difficult to

measure direct outcomes of those

efforts.

Although technical assistance

may be an essential ingredient to a given project, the fact that it occurs early in the
process can blur

its

contribution to producing

new jobs or housing.

CEDAC also faced major hurdles because of a shift in the state's political
administration. Supported by the liberal Governor Dukakis,

CEDAC did not start its

operation until early in the King administration's term in 1979. While Governor

King's view of CEDAC processed from direct opposition to tolerance, without his
active support

CEDAC was forced to seek funding from the legislature on its own.

Governor King further compromised a sound working relationship between

and CEDAC by requiring the former to contract for services from CEDAC,
direct state funding. According to

CDFC

in lieu of

CEDAC personnel, this damaged their credibility

and compromised their effectiveness (CEDAC,
All of these factors contributed to

1983).

CEDAC's shaky funding history. Whereas

CDFC was capitalized with $10 million of state secured funds, during CEDAC's first
four years of operation (1978-82)

During that period,
the Concentrated

it

only received $250,000 from state appropriations.

CEDAC did receive another $700,000 from two federal programs,

Employment Training Act and the Economic Development

Administration, but neither of these programs provided guaranteed sources of

income.
Despite the impediments,

CEDAC managed to "hold on" during the lean King

years, providing technical assistance to

community organizations and, perhaps even

more importantly, learning from their experiences and mistakes. By the end of its
first

four years

•

CEDAC concluded that:

For CDCs to be in a position

to

undertake development, they must have a

clear organizational agenda, an indigenous reason for existing,
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and strong

leadership.

CEDAC's technical assistance could not replace or create these

attributes.

•

The agency needed to be more aggressive in

assisting

CDCs to initiate

developments by identifying viable projects that could be undertaken by
eligible organizations.

•

Nationally,

CDCs that were involved with real estate development were

more successful than those involved with business ventures. Housing and
land use seemed more important to community groups than jobs, which

were viewed as less of a local issue (CEDAC, 1983).

The third and final component of the Massachusetts economic development
system was the Community Enterprise Economic Development Program (CEED).

A

forerunner of this program became operational in 1976 (two years before CDFC's first
loan was made). In response to a request for proposals issued by the Massachusetts

Executive Office of Communities and Development (EOCD) for "production-oriented
as opposed to social service- or advocacy-oriented" community development projects,

44 applications totaling almost $1 million were
available, only four grants could be
to

filed.

made (EOCD,

However, with $69,000

1984). Three of these

awards went

community groups involved with business ventures and one was used for a land use

study.

None were used for housing.

Despite the small size of the pilot program

(or,

perhaps, because of it) there

was

a great deal of enthusiasm for the creation, by the state, of an ongoing capital fund to

help nonprofit groups finance planning and start-up activities. In 1978, the

Massachusetts legislature created the

CEED program, with an appropriation for FY

1979 of $142,450. Between 1978 and 1983, 39 organizations received over $1.5
million in

CEED grants. During the early years of the CEED program, staff assisted

numerous groups with the

initial stages of organizational

development including

incorporation, formulation of community development plans, and board training.
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Yet,

it

was not until 1982-83 that the "organizational efforts [began tol bear fruit, as

the material outputs of CDCs began to blossom"

Unlike CDFC and

(EOCD,

1984).

CEDAC, CEED was able to have a significant impact on

housing during its early years. In 1982 CEED-funded CDCs rehabilitated or created
over 350 units of housing, and in 1983 the number increased by more than 50%, to

530 units.
Overall, by 1983, the state-funded economic development program could boast

several important achievements:

•

The number of CDCs in the state increased from a total of eight in 1976 to
over 50;

•

The total state investment in CDCs leveraged $127.9 million in other
public and private investments for industrial, commercial, and housing

development; and

•

Across the state,

CDC projects created or retained 4,000 jobs (EOCD, 1984).

Conceptually, the state's economic development program included many of the

key pieces of a support system for CDCs.
earliest stages of a group's

First, the

CEED program helped in the

development and provided a unique source of funding to

hire staff and pay overhead costs. Next,

CEDAC provided the young organization

with technical assistance, such as marketing analyses, economic feasibility studies

and financial packaging, as it moved toward project development. And,

finally

CDFC

provided financing to help launch sound business ventures. Although there was at

times overlap in providing technical assistance, particularly between

CEDAC and

CEED, the functions of the three agencies were, for the most part, distinct and
complemented one another.
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From Economic Development to Housing Development:

1984

As discussed in the previous section, Massachusetts' economic development
system was primarily oriented toward providing technical assistance and financing
to

CDCs involved with business and job creation activities. Only the CEED program

included an explicit housing and real estate development focus.
progress report noted three

A 1983 CEDAC

main reasons for its early job-creation focus:

[Biased on the earlier successes of established CDCs, it appeared that
community-based groups could successfully develop housing without assistance
from a support institution like CEDAC. Furthermore, CDFC, which was the
primary financing target for CEDAC assisted projects, would not finance real
estate. Lastly, there was a sense among board members that job creation was a
primary objective for
and an overriding and inadequately addressed
problem in locales that qualify as
target areas (CEDAC, 1983).

CEDAC

CEDAC

Several factors contributed to CDFC's and
housing.

'

CEDAC's decision to move into

Some of these factors had to do with the experience with economic

development, while others related

community development.

to the positive attributes of housing as

First, there

a vehicle for

was enormous frustration about the

of finding the right kinds of business deals to finance.

difficulty

An analysis of the early

community economic development program in Massachusetts observed that:
[T]echnical assistance, useful in turning good venture concepts into sound
In order to
business plans, could not generate good venture concepts
stimulate demand at CDFC, CEDAC's effort turned to finding local
entrepreneurs who wanted to start businesses. Yet, it soon became apparent
that it is primarily the quality of the entrepreneur, not the business plan, that
makes for a good investment. CEDAC staff discovered the lessons bankers
learned years ago: management experience and expertise is indispensable and
very hard to find. Community zeal can achieve great things but the delicate
navigation of and single-minded attention to a business' health, like the
expertise acquired by surgeons or highly trained workers, cannot be found or
developed easily in most communities. (Bratt and Geiser, 1982)

The second factor that contributed
into housing

Although
all

to

CDFC's and CEDAC's decision

to

move

was that the record of CDFC's investments was, overall, disappointing.

this record

may not have been significantly worse than the failure rate for

small businesses, given the level of support being provided through the state
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system, one would have hoped that a much higher percentage of investments would

have brought success. In order to justify state funding, CDFC's investments, while
high

risk,

Housing,

would have

it

to

be better put together than the average small business deals.

was hoped,would provide more opportunities for successful investments.

A third reason why the economic development approach was abandoned was
because of the constraints imposed by the low-income neighborhood. Firms that
leave an area usually do so because of an inability to
residents in low-income areas have

little

extra

make a profit, and by definition

money with which to purchase goods

and services. Thus, CDC's often were sponsoring ventures with inexperienced
entrepreneurs in areas already abandoned by more savvy business persons.
Finally, the low-income nature of the neighborhood notwithstanding, almost

any business venture is faced with an uncertain market once it is operational. In
contrast, a decent unit of affordable housing is virtually guaranteed to find

an eager

tenant.

In addition to the desire to pursue something different in view of these negative
experiences with economic development, there were some positive pressures for the
state agencies to

move into housing.

First, according to

Nancy Nye, "Housing was

what the CDCs were doing or wanted to do and, to be responsive, CDFC needed to

move in that direction. "16
stated:

Similarly, Carl Sussman, executive director of CEDAC,

"We finally became convinced that the resources to do housing development

were not really available

to

most of the CDCs in the

state.

GBCD was not set up to

give technical assistance to community groups doing projects that were too small or
too marginal."i7

The interest in housing on the part of community groups was also

simulated by the dramatic need

felt in

many low-income communities.

Private

market forces, combined with the withdrawal of the federal government from
subsidized housing production, severely affected an already limited supply of
affordable units.
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A second positive pressure urging state agencies toward housing was the fact
that, as a

community development initiative, housing is infinitely more satisfying

than the relatively invisible "economic development." While a storefront or an old

warehouse may be newly occupied by a CDC-supported venture, this type of activity
does not have the same visual impact as watching a formerly vacant lot become the
site of newly constructed

housing or an abandoned building undergo renovation.

Housing is clearly a "concrete" and visible neighborhood-oriented activity.
Finally, during the early 1980s,

HUD began to pursue a policy of allowing

foreclosed multifamily Section 221 (d)(3)

and 236 developments to be sold to the

highest bidder, to be used for market- rate housing. The threat of this happening in

Boston mobilized an effective campaign that persuaded the local
priority to

HUD office to give

new buyers who were committed to maintaining the low- and moderate-

income nature of the developments. Faced with

this situation

and committed to

preventing the possible loss of thousands of low-income units, state

responded

to the

officials

need to salvage the HUD-foreclosed housing.

The shift into housing was rapid. At the end of 1984 CDFC's portfolio was
almost complete for the

first time,

with $9.2 million invested or committed. Of this

amount, some $1.4 million, or 15%, was allocated to housing development projects

(CDFC,

1984).

As for CEDAC, virtually all

their activity is

now in housing. Within

the past few years they have been directly responsible for helping

CDCs rehabilitate

about 700 units of housing, with another 1,300 units underway. With this sense of
accomplishment, most observers agree that the shift from economic development to,

housing development was the right decision.
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THE EMERGENCE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS SYSTEM
OF SUPPORT FOR COMMUNITY-BASED HOUSING
Filling in

Some Missing Pieces

Although the key pieces of the Massachusetts support system for communitybased housing were rooted in the community economic development movement,
several additional agencies and programs have also played important roles. These

are briefly discussed below.

Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MHFA)

Created in 1966 through an act of the Massachusetts legislature, the

Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency

(MHFA) was one of the first state housing

finance agencies in the country. Since 1970,

when construction on the first MHFA-

financed housing began, the agency has made loans totaling $1.2 billion, which
translates into 38,516 rental units

(MHFA,

1983).

MHFA (as well as other state

housing finance agencies) operates by issuing tax-exempt securities. The proceeds
are used to

make below-market interest rate loans to private nonprofit or for-profit

developers

who agree to set aside 25% of the units for low-income tenants, defined

according to public housing limits. Although
capital that has often

CDFC provides a much needed source of

made the difference between a project being launched or not,

MHFA is set up to provide construction or permanent financing for large-scale
housing developments. This source of financing, with
critical

its

clear public purpose, is a

component of the state's overall support system for housing, including

community-based initiatives.
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Massachusetts Government Land Bank

The Massachusetts Government Land Bank, or the "Land Bank," as it is called,
was created in 1975

in response to a Defense

Department announcement that it

would be closing five military installations in the

state.

The Land Bank's mandate

was to "aid private enterprise or public agencies in the speedy and orderly conversion
and redevelopment of certain lands formerly used for military

activities to

military uses" (quoted in Massachusetts Government Land Bank, 1985).
capital provided through $40 million in General Obligation Bonds, the

non-

With

Land Bank

was given a financing capacity to cover any expenses it incurred in the course of its
redevelopment work. With the agency's authorization due

on June 30,

to expire

1980, and with several of the conversions nearing completion, a handful of state
legislators sponsored legislation that prevented the

Land Bank's demise and

broadened its powers. According to Rep. Richard Demers, chair of the House

Commerce and Labor Committee, there was a clear rationale for the Land Bank's
continuance: 'The Land

Bank had served its original function of conduit to the

communities in which bases had been shutdown. However, in the process,
acquired the skills that could be applied

to

it

had

other areas of development" (quoted in

Massachusetts Government Land Bank, 1985,

p. 7).

With the new state legislation, the Land Bank was empowered

to acquire,

develop, and sell surplus state property (as well as surplus federal property located in

Massachusetts) and blighted open or substandard properties. Since

broadened the Land Bank has financed 27

projects, including 17

its

mandate was

with a housing

component, thereby facilitating the rehabilitation of 714 units of low- and moderate-

income housing. Several of these

projects

were developed by nonprofit community-

based groups.
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Additional EOCD -Operated Programs
In addition to the

CEED program, EOCD also administers an array of programs

that are targeted to or can be used by community-based housing groups.

Special Project of the
the Massachusetts

Community Services Block Grant.

Community Services Block Grant for FY

Five percent of

1985, or about $300,000,

was targeted to community-based nonprofit groups. One of its main focuses was to
provide funding for "projects which demonstrate innovative ways to expand
availability

and affordability of existing housing for low-income families and

individuals"

(EOCD, 1985, p.

1).

Small Cities Community Development Block Grants.
federally funded Small Cities

A portion of the

Community Development Block Grant is targeted for

organizational support for community-based nonprofit development organizations

operating at a regional or multicommunity level in rural sections of the state.

Commonwealth Service Corps. During FY 1985 about 700 individuals were
paid from funds provided through the Commonwealth Service Corps program to serve
in community-based neighborhood development

and service delivery projects. Not

only do these paid "volunteers" gain valuable work experience, but they also provide

much needed person-power to nonprofit groups, many of which operate on skeleton
budgets.

Neighborhood Development Front Money Loan Fund. Using $300,000 in
Federal Community Services Block Grant monies, a revolving loan fund was
established to provide seed financing for real estate development projects sponsored

by nonprofit community-based organizations. Aimed at filling a "critical financing
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gap," the specific purpose of this fund

provide the "front end capital required to

is to

bring residential and commercial real estate projects, designed to benefit lower

income residents and to support local neighborhood revitalization objectives to the
point where development financing
at

is

committed by other public and private sources,

which time the seed loans will revolve

for reuse in other

neighborhood real estate

projects" (Tierney, 1984).

EOCD has created a special program to

Neighborhood Housing Services.

support the ten Neighborhood Housing Services Corporations in Massachusetts. For

FY 1985, $760,000 was appropriated to supplement other public and private funds to
assist individual

homeowners to rehabilitate

their properties as well as to support

other neighborhood rehabilitation projects.

Housing Abandonment Program.

Initiated

by EOCD in

FY 1985, the

Housing Abandonment Program reimburses community-based and tenants'
organizations for expenses associated with financing the rehabilitation of tax
f

delinquent, abandoned, or deteriorated residential properties.

$500,000, the program

is

Funded at a level of

aimed at helping economically depressed neighborhoods

recapture a stock of much needed housing.

Organizational Development Fund. Another new EOCD program, the
organizational development fund, was created to supply a source of money (up to

$1,500 per grant)

to

help young

CDCs cover some of the out-of-pocket costs associated

with forming a new organization, such as lawyers'

fees.

Greater Boston Community Development, Inc. (GBCD). Although not part
of the state system,

GBCD has played a significant role in supporting and advancing
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the state's community-based housing agenda. Incorporated as a nonprofit
organization,

GBCD provides technical assistance to community-based sponsors of

housing for low- and moderate-income residents.

Its

primary goal

is to

"enable

community organizations to control the development and management of housing
which

will best serve the needs of lower

people" (GBCD, 1980,
private developer,
their

p. 5).

Although

income families, elderly and handicapped

it

operates in

many respects similarly to a

GBCD's first priority is to help community-based groups achieve

own housing and community development goals.

Since 1964,

GBCD has helped

17 different nonprofit housing sponsors develop 2,750 units of housing in 25

developments. 18 In addition,

GBCD manages about 1,180 units of housing, some of

which the agency also played a role in developing.

One of GBCD's most important contributions has been the way in which it has
used the limited partnership to benefit community-based housing sponsors.

GBCD

claims that it has "structured limited partnerships so as to maximize the financial
benefits to the sponsor and the development while protecting the sponsor's tax

exempt status and control over the development" (GBCD, 1984, p.

12).

With a staff of

almost 60 (including about 38 people involved in property management and
maintenance),

GBCD was instrumental in launching the Boston Housing

Partnership (BHP). The

BHP is a partnership of various public and private actors

with the goal of providing affordable housing.

Its first project

involves some 700

units of housing that are being rehabilitated by 10 community-based groups.

GBCD

has played an active role in virtually every aspect of the demonstration program and
is

in charge of putting together a unique financing package that involves the blanket

syndication of all 10 projects.
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An Outline for an Evaluation of the System

A thorough assessment of the Massachusetts system for supporting communitybased housing activities

is

not possible at this time. First, since

only entered into housing within the past two years, the system
Second, very

little

CDFC and CEDAC
is still

in its infancy.

data presently exists for most of the relevant measures, including:

Housing impacts:
•

Number, physical

•

Maintenance of the units over time.

quality,

and cost of units produced and rehabilitated; and

Neighborhood/market impacts:
•

Evidence of other public and private investment in housing,

retail, or

commercial areas, and public facilities;
•

Evidence of gentrification or forced displacement (e.g., changes in

socio-

economia groups); and
•

Evidence of neighborhood stability (home ownership rates; community
perceptions).

Social impacts:

•

Provision of social services and their

•

Individual tenants' feelings of well-being and security; and

•

Evidence of empowerment among leaders or participants in the housing

effects;

development process.
Organizational impacts:

manage the development;

•

Ability to

•

Track record in producing/rehabilitating additional units; and

•

Ability to act as a voice for residents in other public or private controversies
or development schemes.

In order to broaden our understanding of the capabilities and limitations of

community-based housing, the

state or

some other independent group should launch
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a longitudinal research project that will systematically gather this type of
information. But since the above

list

of measures

is,

at the present,

still

a "wish

list,"

we are faced with the immediate problem of assessing how the Massachusetts system
of supports for community-based housing is working. In the absence of "hard facts"

the following is presented less as an evaluation than as a

way of understanding what

the Massachusetts experience already reveals about how government can support

community-based housing. Pointing out some of the areas that are likely to present
future problems

is also

important both for those involved in the state system as well

as for others with hopes of building similar programs.

OBSERVATIONS FROM THE MASSACHUSETTS EXPERIENCE
The Massachusetts system encompasses many of the key components of the
theoretical

model outlined in section IV, including several funding and subsidy

vehicles and provisions for technical assistance. However,
technical assistance for groups other than the

it

does not focus on

community organizations and it does

not have sufficient subsidy money. Although the state operates several subsidy

programs,

it

must depend on federal resources that are,

at best, uncertain at the

present time. Another drawback to the Massachusetts system
include a comprehensive evaluation system.

is

that

it

does not yet

A thorough assessment of the impacts of

the Massachusetts system should be undertaken, along the lines outlined on page 59.

The

state appears to be a good level of government through

which

to

channel

community-based housing programs. There has been very little work on the idea of
institutionalizing a system of support for community-based housing initiatives.

However, three

distinct proposals can be identified.

The

first,

suggested by Keyes

(1971), outlined the development of metropolitan or state-level

community housing

corporations that would act as conduits for Section 106 funds and provide technical
assistance and financial packaging services to local housing groups, similar to
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GBCD's present operation. The second, outlined by Mott (1984) and sponsored by the
National Low-Income Housing Coalition, called for the creation of a

new community

housing supply program that would target federal funds for housing production and
rehabilitation to projects controlled by neighborhood residents and/or tenants.

Federal, state, and local governments would share in disbursing the subsidy
but, unlike Keyes' proposal, no

new agency would be created.

create a community-based housing supply program,
entitled "Building a

proposal

A third suggestion, to

was outlined in the

Model Support System," on page

money

section

40. Similar to Keyes, in this

GBCD would also be seen as an important model for new local technical

assistance organizations. Interestingly enough, none visualized the type of complex

system created in Massachusetts. Indeed, even the top

political figures

and

administrators in the state didn't appear to foresee the emergence of the present-day

community-based housing system. Perhaps even more remarkable
presence and activity,

it is

is

that despite

only beginning to be viewed as a "system" per

its

se, in

contrast to a series of separate programs. But whether planned or not, something

that can be called a "system" has certainly emerged on the Massachusetts landscape.

Although
advantages,

it

it is

possible that the other theoretical models

does appear that the state

is

would offer clear

a good level through which to channel

community-based housing programs. Some observations on the reason

for this

include:

•

The

state is in a position to pass legislation, create

new programs, and put

significant resources into them;

•

The power and prestige of the governor and his/her executive departments
can

facilitate

program development and coordination;
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•

The state has an opportunity to be in touch with the needs in local
communities;

•

State housing finance agencies have proven to be effective entities for

channeling housing resources and providing housing services (Betnun,
1976);

•

and

The state "feels" like a manageable size through which to operate
community-based housing systems.

However, contrasting a state system with a federal support system, the former
does reveal some weaknesses, including:

•

Some states would never adopt a community-based housing system,
thereby leaving many people and localities without the needed resources.

Only a federal support system would have the

ability to reach the entire

country.

•

The amount of money needed to launch and sustain a community-based
housing system is so large that no state (with the possible exception of
Texas) would have the resources necessary to do the job thoroughly.

•

Not only does a state-based system have inadequate

resources,

it is

also

vulnerable to shifts in policies at the federal level that can significantly

undermine

its

operation.

A progressive/liberal Democratic administration is more likely than a
conservative Republican administration to support a community-based housing

system. The Massachusetts experience, for instance, has shown that a liberal

Democrat, such as Michael Dukakis, has done much more

to

support the community-

based housing agenda than the conservative Edward King (who recently switched

from the Democratic

to the

Republican party). Under Governor King (1979-1982)

CEDAC was almost eliminated, there was very little program development, and
there were few efforts toward coordination. In contrast,
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it

was during Dukakis' first

term (1974-1978) that the three major community economic development initiatives
were launched: CDFC,
(1983-present)

CEDAC and CEED.

Further, during Dukakis' second term

EOCD staff who have extensive prior experience in community-based

housing and have a genuine commitment to the approach have, with the governor,

begun to think through "A State Strategy for Neighborhood Development" (Tierney,
1984) and have developed a host of new programs where important gaps were
identified.

For example, since 1983

EOCD has launched the Housing Abandonment

Program and the Organizational Development Fund. In
directing several of the other programs

it

addition,

EOCD has been

administers-such as Small Cities

Community Development Block Grants, Community Services Block Grants, and the
state Section 705 public housing program-explicitly to

CDCs involved in housing

development. Another important aspect of the emerging state system

is

a

willingness to allocate increased funds into the various programs. Most striking is

that

CEED is now operating on a $1.25 million yearly budget; this is almost as much

as the total

CEED expenditures between 1978 and 1983-which was $1.5 million.

Finally, Dukakis'

EOCD is aware that coordination is a critical component of a

community-based housing system. Alert to potential overlaps in the system,
particularly between

EOCD and CEDAC, EOCD staff spent much of the first six

months of 1983 working out the

institutional links

between CDFC,

CEDAC, and

EOCD. A key result was that CEDAC's board was reconstituted to make the agency
less

independent and

to define its operation

more

explicitly as

an arm of EOCD;

EOCD's deputy assistant secretary for Neighborhoods and Economic Opportunity

now chairs the CEDAC board.
At the

federal level,

we have had ample evidence that liberal Democrats are

much more likely to support housing subsidy programs than are conservative
Republicans, such as Ronald Reagan,

who virtually dismantled the nation's housing

programs. Further, over the past 20 years

it
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has been the Democrats who have

created programs that were, at least at the level of rhetoric, oriented toward

empowering poor people. The War on Poverty and Model
significant weaknesses, did at least give "lip service" to

Cities, despite their

some of the values that

underlie a community-based approach to housing. More recently Jimmy Carter's

Neighborhood Self-Help Development program, which provided a modest supply of
funds directly

to

community groups, and which was quickly removed from the federal

agenda by President Reagan,
Democrats tend to have

is

another example of the sympathy that liberal

for exploring

neighborhood-based solutions to housing and

community development problems. However, while the Democrats look awfully good

when compared to their Republican counterparts, no federal administration has yet
sponsored a comprehensive system of supports for community-based housing.
Potential for replication

may be questionable: It is quite possible that if the

original focus of the state system

had been housing, instead of community economic

development, the system never would have been created. Although the state's

community economic development program was not going to compete with private
entrepreneurs-since

it

was to provide employment business opportunities in areas

that had been abandoned by the private market^the creation of CDFC and

its

capitalization were, nevertheless, the subjects of intense legislative debates.

the community economic development program ultimately prevailed,

it

While

did so only by

a slim margin.

The question is: Could a support system for community-based housing that to

many may appear to be taking business away from private for-profit developers get
needed support? Even though the unassisted private sector is not interested in
producing low-income housing,

for-profit developers are certain to

be against any

program that provides subsidies to build low-income housing that does not include
them. The home builders and real estate trade associations have always been

vehemently opposed to the conventional public housing program, which does not rely
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on private developers and owners. Conversely, these groups have been strong
advocates of the subsidized housing programs in which a role for them was explicit.
It is likely

that

it

would be

difficult to replicate the

Massachusetts system

because of private sector opposition. Even in Massachusetts,

it is

unclear whether

the system ever could have been launched from scratch. Indeed, the state's support

system for community-based housing may only be a lucky accident. Community
economic development was proving difficult to carry out and there was strong support
for the state to

become more involved with low-income housing, notwithstanding any

opposition by the private sector. Although

time that the state began

to support

it

may only be a coincidence, at about the

community-based housing, Governor Dukakis

spearheaded an initiative designed specifically to assist private developers in

undertaking rental developments. The

SHARP program provides a significant

financial incentive for all private developers-both for-profit

predominantly market-rate rental housing. While
to ascribe causality,

it is

and nonprofit>-of

easy,

and possibly erroneous,

SHARP may have helped deflect opposition to the emerging

community-based housing agenda. Thus, in considering how a state supported
community-based housing program could be

replicated, it is important to consider

who the likely opponents would be and how their objections could be handled. Aside
from these

political considerations, the

Massachusetts state program could,

conceptually at least, be replicated.

Targeting of Resources Appears to Be Important.

The young and growing Massachusetts support system has pursued a strategy
of deciding

what programs are important and has then sought funding to implement

them. This approach speaks

to the debate

about whether it

is

better to fund broad

goals through block grants or to specify more explicit program guidelines and to fund

them through categorical

grants. Massachusetts has enjoyed the flexibility provided
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through several federal block grant programs, but as for developing its own strategy,
it

has chosen

to initiate

new categorical programs when it felt a particular need. The

new Housing Abandonment program is a good example of the way in which the state
has defined a problem and then created a program in response.

A Public Support System for Community-Based Housing Initiatives Cannot,
Guarantee That the Actual Programs Will Be Truly Community-Based
The experience with the state's early community economic development
program revealed the difficulty inherent in a level of government trying to stimulate
local responses to problems. If an effort is to be

community-based, what role,

if any, is

appropriate for a public body? According to Annette Rubin-Casas, director of

EOCD's Office of Community Economic Development for Community Non-Profits,
before

CDFC became involved with housing, many CDCs were created that were not

truly community-based. It was not uncommon, for example, for a local entrepreneur

needing assistance

to

launch a business

to

go through the steps of creating a

CDC

that could then serve as a conduit for state funds. 19 However, in pursuing a housing

agenda CDCs may be developing as more

explicit

community-based organizations.

Mike Tierney has stated: "In venture development the CDC is dependent on
entrepreneurial

skills; in

housing development the

CDC is the entrepreneur. "20 The

CDC that coalesces around housing goals and develops a project is almost certain to
be responding to the needs of the community.
ulterior motives. Nevertheless,

it

It is

unlikely that there could be

remains to be seen whether the

state's

community-

based housing system will be successful in providing "top down" supports to truly
"bottom up" activities.
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Individual

Commitment and Expertise Is Essential

The Massachusetts community economic development program emerged from
the social commitment and vision of a handful of community activists, academics,

and legislators. As the program adopted a housing agenda, the conviction of many
first-class professionals that

community-based housing was "the way to go," coupled

with their willingness to put in extra hours, was essential. As one astute observer
recently put

it:

"Hernandez, Edgerly, Whittlesey, and Clancy are the best in the

country at making community development happen."
as the one operating in Massachusetts

is

21

Nevertheless, a system such

not the work of just one or even a few people.

Although there have been some impressive

leaders, the system could not

work

without the scores of committed and competent staff people at the public and quasipublic agencies and at the

CDCs themselves.

Quasi-Public Agencies Are Important Components
Quasi-public agencies such as
the state system. Although
functions performed by

it is

CEDAC, CDFC, and MHFA play critical roles in

theoretically possible that many if not all of the

CEDAC could be carried out by EOCD, it would not be

possible for a state line agency to perform the banking functions of CDFC

Also, the ability of these agencies to pay

allowed them

to

more than the

state's

and MHFA.

maximum salaries has

be more competitive with the private sector and to attract high

quality personnel and hire costly consultants

when necessary.

Finally, quasi-public

agencies are more able to move quickly and to avoid some of the "red tape" that is an

unavoidable part of a state bureaucracy.

The System Needs to Be Flexible
Even in the

short period during which the Massachusetts system has been

operating, the need for flexibility has become apparent.
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The shift from community

economic development to housing development was a radical one and it is a credit to
the people involved that there was a willingness to change. The ability to

acknowledge. problems in the system and to make necessary adjustments was also

apparent when

CEDAC became more closely controlled by EOCD.

New pressures for change are inevitable and the system still has some
important challenges facing it. For example, there

is still

some overlap in the

system, particularly in the area of technical assistance. Second, a handful of CDCs in
the state have matured and are being confronted with

new responsibilities, such as

how to manage their services and investments. The state will have to begin to
develop assistance programs to address the needs of the more seasoned CDCs. Third,

and finally, the state system is going to have

to

get through the lean years at the federal level.

be extremely clever and adaptable to

The last two observations point to

what could become the "Achilles heel" of the Massachusetts system for communitybased housing. As good as the overall program may be, the system is dependent on
federal policies.

The inability of the state to function completely on its own suggests

that a comprehensive community-based housing system would have to be supported
by, if not necessarily implemented by, the federal government.

The System Does Not Include "Deep" Subsidies
The kind of subsidies available through the

federal Section 8

New

Construction/Substantial Rehabilitation program, which guaranteed tenants low
rents while providing owners with adequate operating funds,
state.

is

not provided by the

Although Massachusetts has several subsidy programs, none provides deep

subsidies to community-based housing sponsors

(or, for

that matter, private

developers). Massachusetts' Section 705 is the state's public housing

program and

usually operates through local housing authorities; 22 Section 707 provides rental
assistance similar to the Section 8 existing program; and the
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SHARP program

provides loans (which effectively lowers the interest rate on the mortgage to as low as

5%)

to private for-profit or nonprofit developers

who agree to set aside no less than

25% of the units to low-income tenants. Without a public supply of money that can be
used to substantially lower rents, the Massachusetts system, however comprehensive

and exemplary, may face serious problems. The economics of housing
production/substantial rehabilitation for low-income people simply do not

work

without substantial public subsidies.

The System Depends on Existing Internal Revenue Code Regulations, Which
Are Subject to Change
Although one can visualize a subsidy system that would include generous front-

end or rental subsidies that would make development financially feasible, almost all
privately owned/publicly subsidized housing produced over the past 15 years has

been done through limited partnerships. The

ability of community groups to attract

limited partners, as well as experienced for-profit developers to serve as co-general
partners, is dependent on the continuation of tax laws that include generous

depreciation provisions.

Any changes in the IRS code, such as those presently being

proposed, could dramatically reduce the attractiveness of real estate investment in
general,

and subsidized housing in particular. Without the existing tax advantages,

and without other deep

subsidies,

community-based housing, as it is presently

produced in Massachusetts and elsewhere, would almost certainly be infeasible.

FINAL THOUGHTS
This study of community-based housing and the evolving Massachusetts
support system has argued the following:

•

The current generation of community-based housing sponsors operate
different

way from the preceding nonprofits;
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in a

•

There are many positive attributes of community-based housing, and
although many of the benefits are only theoretical, over the past 25 years
nonprofits have been credited with

•

many concrete successes;

Housing may be the most suitable vehicle for launching a community-based
development project;

•

Massachusetts is the only governmental body

to

have created what has

grown into a fairly comprehensive system of supports for community-based
housing;

•

The Massachusetts system presents an exciting model which,

theoretically,

could be emulated by other states;

•

Despite the

many strengths of a state-based system, the federal

government must play a

role

by providing deep housing subsidies and/or

,

tax incentives. In addition the possibility of the federal government

playing a role in implementing a nationally-based support system for

community-based housing should
•

also be considered;

and

A more thorough evaluation of the impact of the Massachusetts system
should be undertaken.

In conclusion, the Massachusetts system of support for community-based

housing may continue
that is the case,

More

it

to operate

only at the margin of our present housing system. If

will constantly be facing

an uphill fight to sustain

optimistically, the Massachusetts model could

federal housing policy

its

programs.

become a centerpiece of a revived

and a tangible symbol of a new commitment to the universal

right to decent shelter.
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NOTES
1.

Some of the material in this section is revised from Bratt,

1985.

A key criticism of the subsidized production programs that warrants
explanation here is that they have been inequitable. The largest housing subsidy by
far goes to relatively affluent households, those earning over $30,000 per year. The
"home owner's deduction"-the ability of homeowners to deduct mortgage interest and
property tax payments from their incomes in calculating their tax liabilityrepresents a substantial loss in revenue to the U.S. government. Over $36 billion in
taxes were lost in 1982 and it was estimated that at least $50 billion was lost in 1984
(Dolbeare, 1983). It is absurd for critics of public housing and the other production
programs to argue that these programs are inequitable because large benefits are
enjoyed by a few low-income households when even larger benefits are received by all
upper income homeowners. Further, while the President's Commission on Housing
was quick to point out that past housing programs were not equitable "because they
provide a few fortunate tenants very high quality housing at a price less than their
neighbors pay for lower-quality housing" (1982, p. 3), its proposed Housing Payments
Program (HPP) was equally open to criticism: the commission did not recommend
that the HPP be an entitlement program. Thus, one of the key criticisms of the
housing production programs-that they are unfair because they exclude so many
eligible households-is very weak. The problem is inherent in any housing program
that is not an entitlement, and is a function of budgetary priorities.
2.

The first housing allowance program was the Section 23 Leased Public Housing
3.
Program. The Section 8 Existing Housing Program, created in 1974, provides
certificates to low-income households, thereby enabling them to afford an apartment
in the private rental market. In addition, the Urban-Rural Housing Recovery Act of
1983 authorized a new housing voucher demonstration program. At least some of the
enthusiasm for housing vouchers comes from the results of the Experimental
Housing Allowance Program (EHAP). Authorized by Congress in 1970, EHAP tested
how a housing allowance program could be administered and how it would impact
both housing consumers and the local rental housing market.
Although the President's Commission on Housing called rent control "the most
evident interference in the ability of the private market to supply rental housing"
(1982, p. 91), Appelbaum and Gilderbloom (1983) have shown that there is no
difference in the rate of multifamily housing construction between rent-controlled
and non-rent-controlled communities. Therefore, simply eliminating rent control
would not stimulate multifamily construction activity.
4.

HUD

regulations, rentals are based on 30% of income for new
Under present
5.
tenants, an increase from 25% of income. Rentals for existing tenants will rise 1%
per year for 5 years until 30% of income is paid. This new income limit was set in the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981. In July 1983 the House passed a bill
that would have reinstated the 25% of income formula for all public housing
programs. The final legislation enacted by Congress, the Housing and Urban-Rural
Recovery Act of 1983, did not, however, reinstate the 25% of income formula.
However, it did modify deductions on which income is based, thereby reducing rents
for many households.

The Neighborhood Self-Help Development program provided $15 million in
direct federal grants to neighborhood development organizations during 1979 and
6.
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1980. The Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation Act of 1978 set up a permanent
structure for supporting and funding Neighborhood Housing Services (NHS) home
rehabilitation programs. This legislation, as well as the earlier efforts of the HUDFederal Home Loan Bank Board Urban Reinvestment Task Force, was largely
responsible for the growth of NHS programs across the country.
7.
Enacted in 1977, the Community Reinvestment Act authorized federal
regulatory agencies to reject applications for bank mergers and branch openings if
the bank has not met the credit needs of its local community.

While the NHS concept has wide appeal, it has also been the target of criticism.
critics have charged that some of the selected NHS neighborhoods were
not severely deteriorated and that, most likely, they would have been rehabilitated
without public assistance. Furthermore, opponents have pointed out that when a
bank becomes involved with an NHS, it may feel justified in neglecting other innercity areas because it has, essentially, "paid its dues" to the community.
8.

For example,

Model tenements produced for nonprofit, rather than for limited profit, were
extremely rare. Edith Wood, writing in 1919, knew of only two (Friedman, 1968, p.
9.

76).

10.

Keyes (1971) provides the following data from which the 28% figure was

derived:

Units

221

BMIR

Insurance in force
Commitments outstanding

onprofit

Total

45,669
2,458

160,594
8,834

9,799
7,364

32,830
27,428

65,290

229,686

236
Insurance in force
Commitments outstanding
Total

11.
Clancy, et al. (1973) pointed out that "a high level of rent supplement or leased
housing units in a Section 236 project create a more difficult management situation

requiring much greater input of management staff time

.

.

."

(p. 49).

12.
However, the same report also noted that limited-dividend sponsored units
serve minorities more than nonprofit sponsored units do. It also added: "No plausible
explanation can be suggested for this situation" (HUD, 1975b, p. 7).
13.

$150,000 represents foregone interest.

For a thorough evaluation of the various forms of ownership available to a
community-based housing sponsor see, The National Housing Law Project, 1982.
14.

15.

A briefer version of this proposal originally appeared in Bratt, 1985.

16.

Author's interview, April 17, 1985.
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17.
GBCD is the Greater Boston Community Development, Inc., a nonprofit agency
that provides technical assistance to community groups doing housing development
and rehabilitation. It is discussed in greater detail on pages 57-58. Author's
interview May 2, 1985.
18.

These data include the accomplishments of GBCD's predecessor, South End

Community Development. GBCD was formed in
19.

Author's interview, April 17, 1984.

20.

Author's interview, April 24, 1984.

1970.

21.
Jorge Hernandez is the executive director of IBA, a CDC; William Edgerly is
the chair of the board of the State Street Bank and Trust Company and one of the
initiators of the Boston Housing Partnership; Bob Whittlesey was the founder of
GBCD and is currently the executive director of the Boston Housing Partnership; Pat
Clancy is the executive director of GBCD. The statement was made by Mitchell
Sviridoff, president of the Local Initiatives Support Corporation, an organization that
channels private foundation and corporate funds to community-based programs. It
was quoted from "Rehabbing the American Dream," by Christina Robb, The Boston
Globe Magazine, March 31, 1985, p, 65.

In FY 1984, for the first time, EOCD provided Section 705 funds to community22.
based nonprofit housing sponsors located in areas where local housing authorities
were unable to initiate family housing development (Tierney, 1984).
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